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WHAT IS DISCRIMINATORY INTENT?
Aziz Z. Huq†

The Constitution’s protection of racial and religious groups
is organized around the concept of discriminatory intent. But
the Supreme Court has never provided a crisp, single definition of ‘discriminatory intent’ that applies across different institutions and public policy contexts. Instead, current
jurisprudence tacks among numerous, competing conceptions
of unconstitutional intent. Amplifying the doctrine’s complexity, the Court has also taken conflicting approaches to the
question of how to go about substantiating impermissible motives with admissible evidence.
The Court’s pluralistic view of intent is in theory plausible,
and perhaps even unavoidable. But its lack of any consistent
approach in practice to the question of how to sift and weigh
different sorts of evidence of unconstitutional motive is not
defensible. Rather, the current doctrinal apparatus for discovering discriminatory intent has hidden regressive effects: It
subtly and silently moves evidentiary burdens between different plaintiffs and between different defendants. The resulting
case outcomes are likely to shape the way in which the public
perceives the extent and nature of unconstitutional discrimination. This perceptual effect, in turn, compounds and entrenches the doctrine’s regressive distributive effects.
In lieu of current arrangements, I propose a revised doctrinal framework that acknowledges conceptual pluralism in the
constitutional law of antidiscrimination, while encouraging
courts to acknowledge frankly and manage responsibly that
conceptual diversity. It also reorients the evidentiary framework for demonstrating discriminatory intent to mitigate the
presently distorted allocation of judicial resources.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. THE RISE AND RISE OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT . . . . . .
A. The Equal Protection Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Religion Clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1212
1225
1225
1231

† Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago
Law School. My thanks to Deborah Hellman, Naomi Schoenbaum, Nicholas
Stephanopoulos, and Andrew Verstein for terrific and extremely helpful comments. All errors are mine.

1211

R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN503.txt

1212

unknown

Seq: 2

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

30-AUG-18

12:31

[Vol. 103:1211

C. Intent and the Protection of Social Groups: A
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
II. THE DIVERSITY OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENTS . . . . . . . . . 1240
A. Animus as Discriminatory Intent: Taste-Based
Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
B. Impermissible Criteria as Proxies for Licit
Ends: The Problem of Statistical Discrimination
(with Attention to the Double-Effect
Doctrine) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245
C. Anticlassification: Race and Religious
Classifications as Discriminatory Intent . . . . . . 1251
D. The Intent to Promote One’s Status by
Denigrating Others: The Group-Status
Production Theory of Discrimination . . . . . . . . . 1257
E. The Marginal Cases of Bad Intent: The Relation
of Unconscious Bias and Structural
Discrimination to Discriminatory Intent . . . . . . 1259
F. Accounting for the Diversity of Discriminatory
Intents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263
III. THE DISCOVERY OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT . . . . . . . . . . 1265
A. The Semantic Content of Laws and
Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267
B. Official Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
C. Circumstantial Evidence: History and
Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274
D. The Mechanisms of Civil Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . 1277
E. Statistical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281
F. The State of (Evidentiary) Play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1283
IV. RECONSTRUCTING THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1284
A. The Substantive Effects of Evolving Rules for
Discovering Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1284
B. Reconstructing the Judicial Toolbox in
Discriminatory Intent Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1289
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
INTRODUCTION
“Discriminatory intent” is a central term in the judicial
interpretation of constitutional clauses requiring the equal
treatment of persons without regard to their race, ethnicity, or
religion.1 There is nothing inevitable about this. The centrality
1
See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1479 (2017) (discussing how
an intent standard is met); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1831
(2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (concurring in the rejection of a challenge to peti-

R
R
R

R
R

R

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN503.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 3

WHAT IS DISCRIMINATORY INTENT?

30-AUG-18

12:31

1213

of intent is not apparent from the text of the First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.2 And it is quite possible to imagine a jurisprudence of constitutional equality for natural persons that does
not hinge upon the subjective psychological state of the defendant state actor—even if it still relies on some conception of
discrimination as a means to implement the abstract ideal of
equality.3
The central role of intent in the doctrinal framing of individual rights against unconstitutional discrimination is a surprisingly recent doctrinal innovation. As late as 1971, the
Supreme Court in Palmer v. Thompson could claim to find “no
case in this Court [holding] that a legislative act may violate
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men
who voted for it.”4 The Palmer Court’s statement, to be sure, is
carefully calibrated. It carefully skirted prior judicial accountings of legislative intent in early twentieth-century federalism5
and Establishment Clause6 domains. It also put to one side
prior judicial challenges to the racially discriminatory actions
tioner municipality’s use of prayer at the beginning of official meetings by noting
that the mistake was at worst careless and not done with a discriminatory intent);
see also Paul Gowder, Racial Classification and Ascriptive Injury, 92 WASH. U. L.
REV. 325, 333–34 (2014) (“Plaintiffs must show either by direct evidence or by
inference that the state intended to bring about segregation—a state policy that
merely causes segregation, without such intent, is not subject to challenge.”).
2
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); U.S. CONST.
amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
3
For a leading example of such a theory, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). See also Alan David
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052–55 (1978)
(criticizing the role of “fault” and “causation” in antidiscrimination law for precluding relevant inquiries).
4
403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971). For a similar statement in the First Amendment
Free Speech domain, see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)
(quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)), saying that “[t]he
decisions of this Court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the
assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be
exerted.”
5
See, e.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S.
20, 38 (1922) (taking the “intent” of Congress to be pivotal when invalidating a tax
on the products of child labor).
6
See, e.g., Board of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (looking at the
“purpose” of a measure to ascertain compliance with the Establishment Clause);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961) (holding that a state law violates
the Establishment Clause if “its purpose—evidenced either on the face of the
legislation, in conjunction with its legislative history, or in its operative effect—is
to use the State’s coercive power to aid religion”).
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of specific officials.7 Nevertheless, it captures a surprising, and
now largely forgotten, skepticism about the role of intent when
interpreting the Constitution’s protections for vulnerable minority groups.
We know now, of course, that the Palmer Court’s intent
skepticism would prove evanescent. In the same Term it was
abjuring intent in Palmer, the Court doubled down on the role
of improper, non-secular purpose in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.8 The Justices subsequently underscored in no
uncertain terms that officials must not act on the basis of a
preference for one religious denomination.9 Two years after
Palmer, Equal Protection jurisprudence respecting race began
to change course when the Court, in a critical school desegregation case, flagged its attentiveness to any potential impermissible “purpose or intent to segregate.”10 Then, three years
after that, the landmark decision of Washington v. Davis held
that a “discriminatory racial purpose” was “necessary” to state
an Equal Protection violation.11 The last piece of the doctrinal
mosaic to fall into place concerned the Free Exercise Clause.
Long focused on the disparate effect of neutral laws on religious
believers,12 it pivoted sharply in the early 1990s to a new standard in which discriminatory intent played a central role.13 As
7
Cases that are difficult to explain without accounting for intent include
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960), which invalidated an oddly
shared boundary drawn around the city of Tuskegee as motivated by race; and
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969), which invalidated a housing ordinance that placed “special burdens” on racial minorities. Indeed, some of the first
Equal Protection cases concerned discriminatory enforcement of the law. See
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (invalidating conviction of a Chinese national prosecuted in a pattern of discriminatory enforcement of a San
Francisco ordinance concerning laundries).
8
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (imposing a “secular
purpose” requirement). In fact, the use of intent and purpose in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence goes back at least to the direction in Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), that the state may not “prefer one religion over
another.”
9
See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (condemning a state rule
because of its “express design—to burden or favor selected religious
denominations”).
10
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
11
426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
12
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding that government has an obligation to create laws that are neutral in their application to
different religions).
13
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 533 (1993) (holding that “if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral”); see also
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (upholding criminalization of penalties on ceremonial use of peyote, but flagging that there was “no contention that
Oregon’s drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs”).
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a result, intent now plays a central role whenever an individual
litigant invokes the Constitution’s protection against official
discrimination because of race, ethnicity, or faith.
But what does it mean to say that an official action is
motivated by a ‘discriminatory intent’? And how can litigants
in practice prove up an allegation of improper motivation?
These simple questions turn out to have complex answers. For
the federal judiciary has not homed in upon a single definition
of discriminatory intent. Nor has it developed a consistent approach to the evidentiary tools through which discriminatory
intent is substantiated.14 Instead, studied ambiguity in doctrinal formulations means that judges have a large measure of
discretion when resolving constitutional discrimination cases.
Their leeway flows from an ability to tack between different
conceptions of discrimination. It also follows from an ability to
select among various evidentiary mechanisms by which its allegation can be substantiated.
My aim in this Article is to offer a map of discriminatory
intent’s competing definitional and evidentiary strands. By
demonstrating the complexity of definitions and courts’ fickle
approach to questions of proof, I develop the basis for a critique
of the way in which those threads are presently woven together—and a new way forward.
The idea that simple doctrinal terms can mask deep disagreement is hardly new. While few should be surprised that
‘discrimination’ has been productive of dissonance, an illustrative range of the divergent judicial approaches to questions of
proof is helpful to motivate the analysis.15 Three are from the
Supreme Court. One is from a state trial court, but it so usefully illustrates a rarely litigated legal question about discrimination that I include it here too.
First, in March 2017, the Supreme Court rejected a longstanding prohibition on any post-trial inquiry into juror behavior in holding that a Colorado trial court should have allowed
testimonial evidence that a juror “relied on racial stereotypes or
animus to convict a criminal defendant.”16 The dissenting Justices agreed that such discriminatory intent was pernicious
and unconstitutional, but argued that the stability of the com14

See infra subpart II.F.
My analysis focuses on constitutional, rather than statutory, antidiscrimination jurisprudence. Different frameworks of burden shifting have developed in the statutory jurisprudence, and the kinds of evidentiary issues
addressed in Part III that arise in considering government action do not arise.
16
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
15
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mon-law rule against impeaching jurors outweighed the costs
of verdicts tainted by such intent.17 Had the dissenters prevailed, criminal cases where a biased juror does not reveal her
bias until the eve of verdict would have lacked any forum for
airing of discriminatory intent’s role in securing a conviction.
Second, and mere weeks later, the Court invoked statistical
evidence, public statements, and the trial testimony of state
legislators to hold that the use of race as a proxy for partisan
affiliation in North Carolina’s legislative redistricting violated
the Equal Protection Clause.18 No Justice even blinked at the
use of trial testimony this time. Nor did they abjure statistical
evidence—even though similar evidence had previously been
repudiated in the criminal context as evidence of improper racial intent.19 But, unlike the jury bias case, the Court did not
suggest that a litigant needed to point to the presence of stereotypes or other negative views in order to trigger constitutional
scrutiny. The kind of intent the Court searched for seemed
different.
Third, a few months after the North Carolina judgment, a
Minnesota jury issued a verdict of acquittal in the nationally
watched manslaughter trial of police officer Jeronimo Yanez,
related to his shooting of African-American motorist Philando
Castile.20 Although race loomed large in public debate about
the incident—one of many high-profile police shootings of African-Americans—the prosecution’s case rested on evidence
from an expert in police use of force21 and featured neither
testimonial nor empirical inquiries into Officer Yanez’s potential biases. For instance, jurors heard nothing about experimental psychology data that points toward a persistent but
unconscious racial differential in police’s willingness to
shoot.22 As a result, the trial process marginalized the poten17
Id. at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court is surely correct that even a
tincture of racial bias can inflict great damage on that system . . . .”).
18
See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1475 (2017).
19
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–93 (1987) (rejecting the use of
statistical evidence to allege racial bias in the administration of capital sentences).
20
See Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile,
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/policeshooting-trial-philando-castile.html [https://perma.cc/T2KQ-M8PU].
21
See Sarah Horner, Witness Testimony from the Jeronimo Yanez Trial: A
Summary, MINNEAPOLIS STAR (June 15, 2017), http://www.twincities.com/2017/
06/15/yanez-trial-with-jury-in-4th-day-of-deliberations-heres-what-witnessessaid-at-trial/ [https://perma.cc/TL87-YACV].
22
For a recent summary of those studies, see Joshua Correll et al., The Police
Officer’s Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 8
SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 201, 207 (2014), which concluded, on the
basis of several experimental studies, that police have a “prepotent tendency to

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN503.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 7

WHAT IS DISCRIMINATORY INTENT?

30-AUG-18

12:31

1217

tial role of race in police violence cases by omitting statistical
evidence about how race can influence use-of-force decisions
below the surface.
Finally, ten days later, the Court took up another legal
dispute about the role of constitutionally sensitive classification. That case concerned an executive order issued by President Trump imposing limitations on travel to the U.S. by
nationals of six Muslim-majority nations.23 Because the socalled travel ban was challenged on Establishment Clause
grounds for establishing a religious preference, the case
presented the question of whether public statements by a presidential candidate presaging a policy decision targeting Muslims could be introduced in a challenge to a policy action widely
understood as (and arguably explicitly embraced as) the discriminatory one promised during the campaign.24 Despite the
Court’s reliance on government actors’ public statements in the
North Carolina case mere months beforehand, the Government
strenuously insisted that looking at candidate Trump’s statements would be improper—ensuring that the most powerful
evidence of impermissible motive be kept at bay—and, of
course, calling for the case to be resolved without the President, unlike Officer Yanez, testifying.25
These cases—all from a single four-month period in 2017—
suggest some disarray in the ways by which discriminatory
intent can and must be proved. Official statements, statistics,
extrinsic circumstances, and the routine tools of discovery,
such as depositions and interrogatories—all these float in and
out of judicial view. Adding to the confusion, the cases pivot on
quite different conceptions of discriminatory intent. Bias,
these precedents suggest, can be open and obviously invidious;
it can be neutral and functional in orientation; it can be a
matter of the classifications used by state actors in reaching a
decision; or it can be implicit and unconscious, a function of a
state actor’s implicit reliance on invidious background social
structures.

shoot” African-American subjects, but explored ways to manage this tendency
through training.
23
See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
24
See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (2017)
(per curiam). The Court here used a declarative statement to the effect that such
campaign statements are not admissible. But the statement is embedded in a
larger discussion of the government’s position and is thus not plausibly read as a
stand-alone holding.
25
See id.
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It should not surprise that ideas of ‘discrimination’ and
‘discriminatory intent’ would prove so controversial and difficult. Those concepts are closely entangled with notions of
equality, and it has long been clear that the latter is “itself . . . many distinct notions, each an element in its grammar.”26 Moreover, a recent wave of philosophical reflection on
the term discrimination has revealed a range of possible understandings of the term. These efforts do not necessarily lead to a
focus on individual intent in the sense familiar to lawyers and
legal scholars. Deborah Hellman, for example, has identified a
class of “demeaning” classifications applied in the context of
power asymmetries as the core moral wrong of discrimination.27 Benjamin Eidelson concurs that “core cases of wrongful
discrimination” involve acts that “manifest disrespect for the
discriminatees as persons.”28 In contrast, Tarunabh Khaitan
has argued that the “point” of antidiscrimination law is “to
secure an aspect of the well-being of persons by reducing the
abiding, pervasive, and substantial relative disadvantage faced
by members of protected groups.”29 In somewhat similar
terms, Sophia Moreau offers a more liberty-oriented account of
antidiscrimination law as the protection of “deliberative freedom” to make decisions about how to live “insulated from pressures stemming from extraneous traits.”30 When sophisticated
exegetes of the moral right of discrimination diverge so widely,
we should expect that Justices, walled apart by their own partisan and jurisprudential disagreements, will also come to vest a
single term with many different meanings.
My aim is not to adjudicate between competing philosophical accounts of discrimination. Nor do I want to simply casti26
DOUGLAS RAW ET AL., EQUALITIES 132 (1981). A different version of this point
is Peter Westen’s celebrated argument that equality, in the legal context, derived
its meaning wholly from extrinsic sources. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982) (contending that “the idea of equality is
logically indistinguishable from the standard formula of distributive justice”).
27
See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 29–35 (2008). For a
crisp formulation of Hellman’s nuanced claim, see Deborah Hellman, Equal Protection in the Key of Respect, 123 YALE L.J. 3036, 3046–47 (2014), explaining that
“discrimination is wrong when it is demeaning,” and that “[d]emeaning has two
parts, which [she] call[s] the expressive dimension and the power dimension. An
action, policy, or practice demeans if it expresses that the person or people affected are less worthy of equal concern or respect and if it is the action, policy, or
practice of a person or entity that has the power or capacity to put the other
down.”
28
BENJAMIN EIDELSON, DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT 6 (2015).
29
TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 91 (2015).
30
Sophia Moreau, What Is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 143, 147
(2010).
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gate the Justices for their inconstancy (a pointless task).
Instead, I hope to provide a clear mapping of how the slippery
concept of ‘discriminatory intent’ works in practice, and a new
perspective on the distributive consequences of that practice.
To that end, the Article maps out the two sources of judicial discretion in constitutional doctrine intimated by my opening examples.31 The first involves the kind of discriminatory
intent that is alleged. The second concerns the manner in
which it is proved or refuted in different institutional contexts
through admissible evidence. Both these questions—of definition and of proof respectively—are consequential in practice.
How courts translate and then implement the general idea of
discriminatory intent determines how and when norms embedded in the First and Fourteenth Amendments check official
action.32 By carefully parsing the answers to these ‘what’ and
‘how’ questions, I hope to refine our understanding of the nor31
In order to keep the analysis manageable, I focus here on constitutional
law, and not on the statutory law of discriminatory intent. For one analysis of
relevant federal statutes that addresses some of the same theoretical issues, see
Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs,
and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399 (2006). More generally, the employment discrimination literature is focused on defining the ‘right’ kind of intent for statutory
liability. Compare David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 899, 915–19 (1992) (advocating a negligence standard), with Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2017)
(advocating a recklessness model), and Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 13–14
(suggesting that a negligence standard has not been adopted). This is a distinct
normative inquiry from the taxonomical analysis I pursue here.
32
My analysis here is focused on the Constitution’s norms of antidiscrimination that protect vulnerable social groups based on suspect classifications such
as race and religion. “Discriminatory intent” is relevant in other doctrinal contexts—but the relevant conceptions of bias in those other fields is narrower and
more specific and, therefore, does not raise the same concerns of conceptual
pluralism and evidentiary approach as the Equal Protection Clause and Religion
Clauses. For example, the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is violated if an
official acts “out of a desire to prevent . . . First Amendment [activity].” Heffernan
v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016). Other than this reference to the
narrow idea of retaliatory intent, however, Free Speech has tended to avoid doctrinal tests that direct judicial attention narrowly to motivation. Justice Elena Kagan, though, has argued that First Amendment doctrine “comprises a series of
tools to flush out illicit motives and to invalidate actions infected with them.”
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996). Even Kagan,
however, does not contend this function is explicit in doctrinal formulations or
that judges directly ascertain the motives of official actors. Id. The Dormant
Commerce Clause, in contrast, is tailored around a more discrete concern with
“regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests.” Wyoming
v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
This conception of discrimination is also relatively narrow in comparison to the
more complex conceptions at work in the Equal Protection and Religion Clause
contexts.
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mative choices implicit in the present doctrine—and in particular to identify its distributive consequences for different
ascriptive groups.
Consider first what the term ‘discriminatory intent’ means
when it comes to traits such as race, ethnicity, alienage, and
gender.33 The term is often used almost interchangeably with
words like motivation, purpose, and animus.34 It can profitably be understood to encompass legal theories of antidiscrimination which account for the mental state of the alleged
malefactor. Intent is hence commonly viewed as distinct from,
and even at war with, a consequence-focused conception of
disparate impact.35 In this Article, I use the term ‘discriminatory intent’ to capture any theory of antidiscrimination liability
that turns in any way upon the cognitive processes of the alleged discriminator. Importantly, this includes rules that look
to the semantic content of the rules that the alleged discriminator applied. Thus, my taxonomy and analysis capture as much
of the law as possible. This allows me to consider the extent to
which core conceptions of discrimination are related to what at
first blush might seem to be unrelated concepts, such as a
‘colorblind’ anticlassification rule. I conclude, perhaps a touch
counterintuitively, that the norm of colorblindness is appropriately understood as a rule against a certain kind of discriminatory intent.
With that in mind, the seemingly simple concept of discriminatory intent can be disaggregated into at least five dis33
The idea of discrimination also arises under the Dormant Commerce
Clause. See, e.g., S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 169 (1999)
(holding a state tax on capital stock unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause
because it “facially discriminates against interstate commerce”). But the kind of
discrimination at issue in Dormant Commerce Clause cases is distinct and different from the kind at issue in Equal Protection and First Amendment cases. The
former is a species of economic dealing, most often by legislatures directed at a
large group of faceless nonresidents not modeled as possessing any distinctive
traits. The gap between this notion of discrimination and the notion at stake in
the Equal Protection and First Amendment contexts is sufficiently large that it
seems unwise to conflate the concepts.
34
See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (describing the bare desire to harm as an “improper animus or purpose”); Lyng v. UAW,
485 U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988) (characterizing such motives as “illegitimate”).
35
See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round
Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 495 (2003) (identifying the possibility that “equal
protection might affirmatively prohibit the use of statutory disparate impact standards”). There are also conceptual approaches to antidiscrimination law that
align disparate treatment and disparate impact as two means of achieving the
same goal. See Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97
B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1359–60 (2017) (arguing that a form of “status causation”
underpins both species of liability).
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tinct theoretical strands. First, perhaps the most intuitive
meaning of discriminatory intent is action taken as a result of
“a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group,”36 or another aversive view of the group.
Second, a suspect classification might be used not out of a
desire to harm, but because it is deemed a more efficient
source of information about how to achieve a licit goal than
readily available alternatives. This too can trigger constitutional scrutiny.37 Race, for example, might be thought to predict partisan identity. Or, religion can be taken as a proxy for
terrorism risk.38
A third possibility is that a discriminatory intent is present
on any occasion upon which the relevant criterion plays a role
in government decision making. This is often known as an
“anticlassification” principle.39 The latter is easy to conceptualize as hinging on the semantic content of the law, and not
the quality of the decision maker’s intentions.40 But it is a
mistake to think of anticlassification as exhausted by a concern with the facial content of the law. The logic of anticlassification, I will argue, is also necessarily concerned with the
quality of official intentions, above and beyond the content of
legal texts.
Fourth, an impermissible classification can work as a
marker of the boundary between two hierarchically arranged
social groups even when applied in a seemingly neutral and
evenhanded way. This ‘social group polarization’ approach illuminates several early decisions concerning laws that formally
applied in evenhanded ways. Yet it is rarely mentioned now.
Finally, a prohibited classification might play a subtler
psychological role—one that the official in question might not
immediately recognize because of implicit bias or the culpable
36

U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 n.1 (2017) (“A plaintiff
succeeds at [the first stage of the analysis] even if the evidence reveals that a
legislature elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other
goals, including political ones.”).
38
Notice that this is distinct from the idea that a licit trait might be employed
as a proxy for an impermissible criterion.
39
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) ( “[T]he
anticlassification . . . principle holds that the government may not classify people
either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category: for example,
their race.”).
40
Cf. id. (identifying intentional discrimination as a supplement case that
might “also” count as a violation of the anticlassification principle, rather than a
core case).
37
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failure to account for structural inequalities.41 These forms of
reckless or negligent action are analogous to bad intent in ways
that make them appropriate subjects here, falling just within
the perimeter of my analytic reach.
These different conceptions of discriminatory intent are, to
be sure, difficult to distinguish sharply. They have fuzzy, overlapping boundaries. Rather than frankly recognize plurality
and overlapping conceptualizations of discriminatory intent,
however, federal courts treat the concept as unitary.42 The result is that judges retain considerable discretion to move between different versions of discriminatory intent. How this
discretion is exercised, I will argue, can and does raise substantial normative questions. This is because the way in which
judges exercise their discretion can hinge upon their subjective
evaluations of the importance of different discrimination-related harms. Worse, the weight of different harms often seems
to depend on the identities of the perpetrator and the state
actor. Paradoxically, antidiscrimination law can itself have a
discriminatory cast.
There is a second reason why the jurisprudence of discriminatory intent remains unpredictable and incoherent in practice. There are a number of ways to prove the presence of
discriminatory intent. Five evidentiary tactics stand out.43
First, a judge might look at the superficial, semantic content of a decision—the text of a law or an executive order, for
example. Second, they might look to the oral statements of the
relevant decision maker. Third, that decision could be situated
in its context by looking upstream at the sequence of events
leading up to its execution and then downstream to its consequences. This context may well provide powerful circumstantial evidence of an improper motivation. Fourth, in some cases,
the motivations of the relevant government actor can be directly probed using the well-worn instruments of civil discovery, such as depositions and interrogatories. Fifth, a judge
might consider statistical evidence derived from an
econometric analysis to the effect that an impermissible classification played a role in government decision making.
Despite having embraced all of these evidentiary instruments at one moment or another since the mid-1970s, when
41
See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 473–75 (2010) (discussing the
pervasiveness of implicit, unconscious biases).
42
See infra Part II.
43
See infra Part III.
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intent was first coming into its doctrinal ascendancy, the Court
has since backpedaled—albeit in fits and starts. It has showed
no overt recognition that changes in the kinds of evidence
available to show bias lead inexorably to changes in the kinds
of bias that can successfully be challenged in court.44 Its untheorized and sub rosa reorientation of constitutional antidiscrimination law should provoke concern not only because that
change has been subject to no careful judicial or academic
scrutiny, but also because it has operated as a subterranean
way of changing the reach and coverage of the Constitution’s
foundational protections for vulnerable minorities.
This matters because the idea of discriminatory intent
plays a large role in many contemporary policy flashpoints. It
bubbles to the surface of national debate over the so-called
travel ban, the persistence of police violence against AfricanAmerican men and women,45 and the cyclic resurgence of contestation about affirmative action.46 More generally, recent
events in the public sphere have demonstrated that even the
most naked and virulent forms of animus continue to mar the
American body politic.47 Their influence on officials empowered with the enormous discretionary authorities of today’s
government cannot be dismissed out of hand. In this context,
rigorous and fair-minded thinking about how to define and
discover discriminatory intent is surely needed more than ever.
My focus on the concept of discriminatory intent, and the
mechanics of its substantiation in court, is a departure from
the literature’s dominant concerns. There is now abundant
scholarly commentary on what might be called the grand theories of equality or religion threading through the Constitution.48 Questions of how discriminatory intent is defined and
44

See infra Part IV.
See Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in
Police Use of Force (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399,
2016) (identifying racial disparities in use of police force, but not police shootings).
46
See Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. to Take on Affirmative Action in College
Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/
us/politics/trump-affirmative-action-universities.html?hpw&rref=us&action=
click&pgtype=Homepage&module=well-region&region=bottom-well&WT.nav=bot
tom-well [https://perma.cc/DH3S-UPBQ] (noting renewed interest among political branches for enforcing limits on affirmative action).
47
See id.
48
In respect to the Equal Protection Clause, important recent scholarship
focuses on overarching goals and broad, synoptic judgments. See, e.g., Russell K.
Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 154 (2016) (contending that
“the Supreme Court has steadily diminished the vigor of the Equal Protection
Clause in most respects”); Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Siegel, Equality Divided]. A number of recent articles,
45
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proved tend to be ancillary and subordinate to a larger critique
of the ideological orientation of the doctrine.49 In contrast, the
only extended study of the manner by which judges discover
discriminatory intent is almost twenty years old.50
My argument proceeds in four steps. Part I begins by
charting the ascendency of discriminatory intent as a touchstone of liability under the Equal Protection and Religion
Clauses. The following Part develops the claim that ‘intent’ is
however, critique specific elements of the judiciary’s framework for implementing
the idea of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products:
Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183 (discussing the four decisions that form the foundation of the “anti-animus doctrine” of Equal Protection).
In addition, Richard Fallon has offered a searching critique of the idea of legislative intent more generally. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden
Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523 (2016). My discussion of impermissible
intent in the legislative context overlaps in focus with Fallon’s piece. My aim,
however, is to understand how judicial scrutiny of legislative intent interacts with
judicial scrutiny of other officials’ motivations under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. In contrast, recent Religion Clause scholarship focuses on precise
doctrinal questions related to the hotly contested question of accommodations
from generally applicable laws, see Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience
Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J.
2516 (2015), and the status of corporate entities, see Elizabeth Sepper, Free
Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1469–70 (2015).
49
One recent major contribution, by the Critical Race theorist Ian HaneyLópez, argues that the Justices have “split equal protection into the separate
domains . . . one governing affirmative action and the other discrimination against
non-Whites” in a move that has made it systematically easier for white plaintiffs to
prevail. Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1828
(2012). He asserts that the Court has “rejected inquiring into the thoughts of
individual government actors.” Id. at 1795. He also harshly criticizes the turn to
intent and the refusal to distinguish remedial from “oppressive” race-conscious
measures. Id. at 1805–06, 1815–16. Unlike Haney-López, I do not aim here to
critique the Court’s conception of Equal Protection. Indeed, I read the doctrine as
remaining more open and pluralistic than he does. Moreover, unlike him, I focus
on the shifting conceptual and evidentiary methods under the rubric of discriminatory intent as the causal mechanism through which the focus of the courts has
shifted.
50
See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L. REV. 279, 284 (1997). Selmi’s central claim is
that “the Court has only seen discrimination, absent a facial classification, in the
most overt or obvious situations—situations that could not be explained on any
basis other than race.” Id. Whereas Selmi focuses on the narrowing of the intent
inquiry, my aim is to explore the range of definitional, analytic, and empirical
options at play in the judicial discernment of discriminatory intent. Another
earlier article critiques the counterfactual method of ascertaining unlawful intent
as impossible to implement. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal
Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1113–14 (1989). In my view, the counterfactual
method for analyzing discriminatory intent is simply a way of framing the question whether unlawful intent is at work, and not a way of answering that question.
Finally, a recent student note draws on conceptions of intent from psychology to
argue for treating foreseeable harms as intentional. Julia Kobick, Note, Discriminatory Intent Reconsidered: Folk Concepts of Intentionality and Equal Protection
Jurisprudence, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517, 519–20 (2010).
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not a singular concept, but better understood as encompassing
an array of different possibilities. It offers an analytically generic typology of meanings. Part III catalogs the evidentiary
instruments available for identifying impermissible motives.
One inference that follows from the taxonomy is negative:
There is no neutral way of putting into practice the idea of
discriminatory intent. As in any craft, the choice of tools
changes the nature of the ultimate product. Normatively
freighted choices are simply unavoidable. The final Part pivots
to a critique of the Court’s observed choices on the basis of
their distributive and epistemic effects. That is, it examines the
way in which the Justices’ choices allocate scarce judicial resources between different victims of discrimination, and the
way in which they shape public understanding of discrimination’s moral harm.
I
THE RISE AND RISE OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
This Part maps the emergence of discriminatory intent as a
touchstone of jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause
and the Religion Clause. My account of Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence focuses largely on race, where the key
precedents were handed down. But I also draw upon case law
about other suspect classifications and fundamental rights insofar as they are pertinent to the story.
A. The Equal Protection Clause
Enacted later, but liquidated in court more quickly than
most other elements of the Constitution’s text, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generated a jurisprudence of intent within the first two decades of its
ratification—at least in respect to administration of the laws, if
not to legislation.51 There was nothing inevitable about this
doctrinal move. The Court’s first major interpretation of the
Clause, in the 1880 case of Strauder v. West Virginia, did not
hinge on intent.52 Strauder concerned a state statute that limited jury service to “white male persons who are twenty-one
51
The leading accounts of the Equal Protection Clause’s adoption emphasize
the divergence of views among those who debated and adopted the measure. E.g.,
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 126, 131 (1988); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original
Understanding of “Equal Protection of the Laws”, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421, 432
(1972).
52
100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880).
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years of age.”53 Invalidating the conviction of an African-American man under this regime, the Court found a failure of formal
equality on the face of the statute that violated the Constitution’s “immunity from inequality of legal protection.”54 It was
the “statute” rather than any person, the Court explained, that
“discriminat[ed]” in the sense of unevenly extending the protection of state law.55 Later cases suggested that the complete
exclusion of African-Americans from juries could be prima facie
evidence of a constitutional violation.56 Defendants hence were
constitutionally entitled to introduce evidence of such exclusion.57 But the analytic reach of jury exclusion cases did not
enlarge much before the Court imposed stringent evidentiary
requirements that in practice foreclosed Strauder challenges.58
Such interactions between substantive laws and evidentiary
protocols were to prove an important element in the story of
Equal Protection doctrine, and a central pivot of my story here.
Seven years after Strauder, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the
Court was presented with a habeas petition from a Chinese
national convicted under a San Francisco municipal ordinance
regulating the licensing of laundries.59 Although the petitioner
attacked the ordinance both on its face and as applied, the
Court considered solely the motives behind the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.60 In particular, the Justices focused
on the selective enforcement of the ordinance against Chinese
laundry owners as evidence of the “hostility to the race and
nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the
eye of the law, is not justified.”61 Absent evidence of discriminatory intent, the Court clarified in a sequel case—again one
involving evenhandedness in the enforcement of San Francisco

53

Id. at 305 (citation omitted).
Id. at 310.
55
Id. For an extension of this logic, see Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584
(1883), which rejected a challenge to a statute that imposed higher penalties on
interracial rather than intraracial fornication because “[e]quality of protection
under the laws implies not only accessibility by each one, whatever his race, on
the same terms with others to the courts of the country for the security of his
person and property, but that in the administration of criminal justice he shall
not be subjected, for the same offence, to any greater or different punishment.”
56
See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881).
57
See Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 449 (1900).
58
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The
Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1462–63 (1983).
59
118 U.S. 356, 356–57 (1886).
60
See id. at 373–74.
61
Id. at 374.
54
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ordinances—that no Equal Protection challenge would stand.62
Strauder and Yick Wo thus reflect distinct doctrinal potentialities embedded in the Equal Protection Clause. They were harbingers of a concern about classification and a concern about
animus, respectively.63
Yick Wo’s immediate implications were stifled by the federal judiciary’s endorsement of state-enforced segregation.
This culminated, of course, in Plessy v. Ferguson. While not
disavowing Yick Wo, the Plessy Court blocked any inquiry into
the motives of state actors by suggesting that any “badge of
inferiority” flowing from segregation arose “because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it.”64 Plessy thus
undercut arguments about official intent by placing blame for
racial stratification on “social prejudices” and the “general sentiment of the community,”65 as if these had nothing to do with
law. Since the Justices then likely approved of racial segregation as public policy,66 they were hardly likely to perceive an
improper motive at work in Louisiana’s segregation of railroad
passengers by race.67
Only in the late twentieth century, as the Court worked
though the implications of the majestic opacities of Brown v.
Board of Education,68 did the idea of discriminatory intent
come to the fore once more. Brown repudiated Plessy’s conclusion that de jure segregation had no direct impact on African62
See Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1905) (noting that petitioner
had failed to show that there were non-Chinese-owned establishments that had
been spared enforcement).
63
The theme of normative pluralism runs through the best historical scholarship on the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment. See Alexander M. Bickel, The
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 63
(1955) (finding in the enactment history of the Fourteenth Amendment “no specific purpose going beyond the coverage of the Civil Rights Act is suggested; rather
an awareness on the part of these framers that it was a constitution they were
writing, which led to a choice of language capable of growth.”); see also DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
1789–1888 at 349–50, 349 n.143 (1985) (suggesting that the Equal Protection
Clause was understood initially only to apply to “remedial” or “protective” functions of state government). One consequence of the diversity of original public
understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment is that there is necessarily a measure of interpretive space for doctrinal pathways as diverse as Strauder and Yick
Wo.
64
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
65
Id.
66
See Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 332.
67
Hence the Court’s failure, twelve years after Plessy, even to inquire into the
motives behind a Kentucky law that prohibited integrated colleges. See Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1908) (upholding the measure as a valid
exercise of the state’s police power in respect to corporations).
68
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Americans’ “status in the community.”69 But otherwise the
Court’s opinion in Brown did not clarify “which conception of
discrimination [the Court] embraced, or how far the principle of
[Equal Protection] extended.”70 Over the next two decades, the
ensuing desegregation litigation did not require the Court to
select a “precise identification of the objectionable aspect of
racial classifications.”71 Only when the city of Jackson, Mississippi, closed its public swimming pools to stymie court-ordered
integration was the Court confronted with a state action clearly
motivated by an improper animus yet simultaneously evenhanded in its semantic content and effect.72 A closely divided
Court held in Palmer v. Thompson that the “bad motives” of the
measure’s legislative supporters did not bear on its
constitutionality.73
This rule did not endure. Faced with a turn by lower courts
to a disparate impact standard,74 the Court in 1976 in Washington v. Davis held that “the basic equal protection principle
[is] that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”75 Much criticized even at the time, Washington explicitly rested on a concern about the destabilizing effects
of a constitutional effects rule. But the fact that the Court had
a clear idea of what it disfavored did not mean it understood
the alternative that it was embracing.76 Indeed, because the
69

Id. at 494.
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 935, 947 (1989) [hereinafter Strauss, Discriminatory Intent].
71
Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90
MICH. L. REV. 213, 296 (1991).
72
See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
73
Id. at 225. For early critical commentary that anticipated later judicial
criticisms, see Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95.
74
See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 959–60 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev’d sub nom. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (remarking “that use of
selection procedures that do not have a disparate effect on blacks would have
resulted in an even greater percentage of black police officers than exists today”);
Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm., 482
F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1973) (requiring that plaintiffs show a sufficient “disparity between the hiring of Whites and minorities”).
75
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
76
Id. at 248 (“A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens
one race more than another would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes . . . .”); see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S.
222, 229 (1985) (striking down a racially neutral felon disenfranchisement law
enacted by the Alabama constitutional convention in 1901 because the law had
been motivated by a “zeal for white supremacy”). For early criticism, see Theodore
70
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Justices in Washington faced a record with no evidence of such
invidious purpose,77 they had no need to do more than reject a
disparate impact standard (albeit without necessarily rejecting
evidence of a disparate impact as probative of a discriminatory
intent). They thus had no need to reckon with the different
ways an impermissible classification or animus might figure in
a decisional process.
Over time, ambiguity about the precise nature of the discriminatory intent that lay at the heart of an Equal Protection
violation became generative rather than paralyzing. Without
the encumbrance of a fixed point of analytic departure, the
Court wrought a doctrinal framework in which subtly distinct
notions of intent could play a role. Within the race context, for
example, the Court increasingly devoted its scare resources to
the government’s use of “race-based measures” that classified
using race on their face.78 Any occasion on which “the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual
racial classifications,” the Court cautioned, “would lead to
‘strict scrutiny.’”79 In contrast, in the context of rules that
overtly classify by gender, after some wobbling,80 the Court
settled into the practice of querying whether a legal distinction
is “in reliance on ‘[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic
roles . . . .’”81
Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977).
77
To the contrary, the case involved a personnel test administered by the
Washington, D.C. police department, and the record contained evidence of the
“affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department to recruit black officers.” Davis, 426 U.S. at 246.
78
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); see also
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal racial
classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.”).
79
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
720 (2007); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (describing the
use of such classifications as “pernicious” (citation omitted)).
80
For example, the Court held that pregnancy discrimination in state insurance coverage fell outside the compass of Equal Protection, justified by the assertion that there was “no risk from which men are protected and women are not.”
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974). Geduldig failed to inquire into
stereotypes or impermissible intent, placing it in the category of disparate impact
cases (although one that was wrongly decided even on those terms).
81
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017) (quoting Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003)); see also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (expressing similar concern about laws
based on “archaic and overbroad generalizations”); see also Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (expressing that “something
more than accident is necessary to justify the disparate treatment [of women] who
have as strong a claim to equal treatment as do similarily situated surviving
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In the absence of an overt classification, the Court’s approach to allegations of improper bias against minorities oscillated, yielding inconsistent results across cases.82 In one line
of cases that did not involve the application of strict scrutiny, it
emphasized that “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” necessarily clashed with the Equal Protection
Clause.83 These cases varied in subject-matter, touching on
voting, fiscal distributions, and the taxation of out-of-state car
purchases. And they rested on a variety of rationales, including the lack of “a legitimate and specific explanation” or the
presence of “stereotypic assumptions or hostility toward a
class.”84 Hence, the doctrinal framework for the evaluation of
discriminatory intent seems to vary depending on whether a
formal classification, a stereotype, or an unexplained hostility
is perceived to be at work.
Nor did the cases that followed immediately on Washington
v. Davis’s heels resolve the question of what evidence could be
used to prove bad intent. Instead, the Court initially took a
sweeping view of the kinds of evidence admissible to demonstrate discriminatory intent85—an element of the doctrine I
shall explore at greater length below—and a narrow view of
whether the Constitution was violated in cases of mixed mospouses.”). The intent requirement in gender Equal Protection jurisprudence has
traveled a crooked path. Klarman, supra note 71, at 304 (noting the “apparently
chaotic” character of the early gender jurisprudence). Five years after Washington
v. Davis, for example, the Court upheld California’s statutory rape law against a
challenge that it discriminately targeted men alone. See Michael M. v. Superior
Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1981). Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Rehnquist parenthetically noted the petitioner’s argument that the statute “rests on archaic stereotypes,” but rejected this contention with a citation to
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). Michael M., 450 U.S. at 472
n.7.
82
See infra subpart II.B.
83
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985)
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973)); see also Lyng v.
UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988) (characterizing such motives as “illegitimate”).
The Court also uses the term “animus” to capture the same idea. See United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (describing the bare desire to
harm as an “improper animus or purpose”); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 634 (1996).
84
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 489
(2004) (collecting cases).
85
See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266–68 (1977) (demanding a “sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and
direct evidence of intent as may be available,” including the impact and the
history leading up to the decision); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496–97
(1977) (accepting mathematical evidence to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination).
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tives.86 Uncertainty rapidly became apparent in the Court’s
handling of how allegations of unconstitutional bias against a
protected group were proved up. Unguided by any disciplining
procedure or logic, the Court could oscillate abruptly between
cases.
An example of such inconsistency in the treatment of circumstantial evidence of bad intent is found in two cases
wherein at-large voting systems were challenged as tainted by
discriminatory intent. One of these cases elicited a studied
refusal to account for the circumstantial evidence of intent,87
while the other generated a careful tallying of relevant clues.88
Unsurprisingly, the two cases also yielded different results.
In sum, while the idea of “discriminatory intent” has served
since 1976 as an organizing principle in Equal Protection jurisprudence, the Court has not hewed to a clear and specific
understanding of such “intent,” or a single understanding of
how it is to be proved. Whereas some lines of cases underscore
the distinctively negative or aversive quality of unconstitutional
purposes, other lines of cases turn on the stereotypical content
of the government’s intent. Yet other lines of cases make the
assumption that the mere presence of race as a criterion in a
process of government decision-making suffices to trigger a
constitutional worry. Even within the bounds of Equal Protection jurisprudence, therefore, the idea of an unconstitutionally
discriminatory intent has become remarkably plural since
1976.
B. The Religion Clauses
Government motive—in particular, the intention to discriminate either for or against religion, or else between denominations—has loomed large since the inception of
86
See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (proof of discriminatory purpose requires showing that the government decision-maker “selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in
spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”). Feeney thus narrowed
the kinds of intention that counted for the constitutional purposes by excluding
cases in which racial effects were anticipated but not intended. Some commentators treat the case as a ruling on the evidence that can be used to demonstrate
unlawful intent. Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 48, at 19. But Feeney does
not preclude the evidentiary use of a law’s consequences to gauge intent. Rather,
it directs that certain kinds of intent are not inconsistent with the Constitution.
87
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 73 (1976) (describing evidence of bias
as most tenuous and circumstantial). But see Selmi, supra note 50, at 310–11
(pointing out persuasive evidence of “the perpetuation of an all-white local election scheme in Mobile” that was available to the Court but ignored).
88
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 625–26 (1982) (carefully accounting for
evidence of bias and invalidating Burke County, Georgia’s redistricting scheme).
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence.89 It has also come to
play an increasing pivotal role in Free Exercise cases since the
early 1990s.90 As in the Equal Protection context, the Court
has identified the government actor’s intentions as analytically
pivotal, rather than the consequences of its actions or its impingement on some fixed and discernable “immunity” under
the Constitution.91 As in the Equal Protection context, the doctrinally relevant sense of ‘intent’ consistently reflects some kind
of binary opposition in which religion (or a particular denomination) is either favored or disfavored. In some iterations, the
psychological and processual quality of the term ‘intent’ frays,
ceding ground to a more objective-seeming inquiry into an externally determined ‘purpose.’ Still, the doctrine at its core
maintains, albeit as one element of many, an intuition that
certain motivations are unconstitutional because they entail
discrimination on religion-related grounds.92
As of the beginning of 1947, the Supreme Court had decided only two Establishment Clause cases. But neither left
any enduring impact upon the law.93 In its first major engagement with the Clause, the Court upheld that year, a decision by
Ewing Township, New Jersey, to provide free transportation to
all non-profit schools, including sectarian ones.94 In influential dicta, the Court spelled out a synoptic understanding of the
Clause that prohibited certain measures based on their effect,
and in particular, whether they “aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”95 Fourteen years
later, upholding Maryland’s Sunday closing laws, the Court
89
See, e.g., Corbin, infra note 92, at 306 (explaining that motives behind
government action are only illegitimate if there is “a discriminatory intent to
devalue or exclude minority religions”).
90
See id. at 303 (explaining that after a 1990 case, Employment Division v.
Smith, “neutral laws of general applicability, regardless of the impact they may
have on a religious practice, do not violate the Free Exercise Clause” because they
lack discriminatory intent).
91
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 55 (1913) (“[A]n immunity is one’s
freedom from the legal power or ‘control’ of another as regards some legal
relation.”).
92
My reading of the doctrine differs from others who find intentionality only
in very recent Supreme Court doctrine. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Intentional Discrimination in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 67 ALA. L. REV. 299,
304 (2015) (dating the role of intent in Establishment Clause analysis to the 2015
case of Town of Greece v. Galloway).
93
Both involved federal spending on sectarian institutions. See Quick Bear
v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (discussing sectarian schools); Bradfield v. Roberts,
175 U.S. 291 (1899) (concerning a religiously affiliated hospital).
94
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947)
95
Id. at 15.
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subtly reformulated the doctrinal test to train upon the “purpose and effect” of challenged laws.96 The Court two years later
examined the “purpose” of a Pennsylvania town’s statute mandating that school days begin with a Bible reading to determine
whether it was “secular.”97 And by 1971, the requirement of “a
secular legislative purpose” seemed a touchstone of Establishment Clause analysis.98
In many cases, this litmus test for constitutionality resulted in a close examination of the state’s proffered justifications for a statute—cases that often involved some form of aid
to sectarian educational institutions—to ascertain whether
they were pretextual, rather than an exposition of how “purpose” in this context was conceptualized or ascertained.99 In
other cases, the Court disapproved of government action on the
ground that it was intended “to endorse or disapprove of
religion.”100
Purpose plays a role now in two ongoing lines of Establishment Clause cases. The first concerns the judicial analysis of
physical fixtures such as displays, statutes, and monuments
alleged to “establish” religion in a quite concrete sense. The
leading precedent concerns the posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms, but there are endless variants.101 These
cases, to be sure, do not involve a ‘discriminatory’ intent in the
sense of an invidious, negative view of a certain class. But they
do involve an improper intention respecting religion. They con96

See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (rejecting
proffered secular motives). Earlier school prayer decisions had not rested on a
finding of improper purpose, but on effects. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430
(1962) (“There can be no doubt that New York’s state prayer program officially
establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents’ prayer.”).
98
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); accord Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977)
(stating that “[i]n order to pass muster, a statute must have a secular legislative
purpose . . . .”).
99
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(“[I]f the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular purpose, offers
aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all who adequately further
that purpose . . . then it is fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only
has the effect of furthering that secular purpose.” (citations omitted)); Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) (endorsing proffered reasons for religious
organization tax exemptions).
100
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (quotation omitted).
101
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government’s actual purpose
is to endorse or disapprove of religion.”); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)
(“The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom
walls is plainly religious in nature.”).
97
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cern a mental state of ‘discrimination,’ that is, in roughly the
same way as affirmative action. The latter trigger strict scrutiny not necessarily because they are animated by a hatred of
Caucasians, but rather “because racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment.”102 Establishment Clause scrutiny of facial religious distinctions, by
analogy, can be understood as constitutionally suspect because such classifications are also “so seldom . . . relevant.”103
The most extended discussion of the role of the intentions
and purposes of official actors in Establishment Clause cases
can be found in a 2005 plurality decision holding unconstitutional the posting of the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky
county courtrooms.104 The defendant counties had initially
posted large, prominent replicas of the Decalogue in courtrooms. Once these were challenged, the counties twice shuffled their exhibits so as to include an increasing variety of
secular images, including the Magna Carta and the Declaration
of Independence.105
Writing for a plurality, Justice Souter rejected the counties’
submission that the idea of purpose was too inchoate to operationalize. The plurality cited cases—including Washington v.
Davis—in which purpose was a touchstone of constitutional
validity.106 “[A]n understanding of official objective emerges
from readily discoverable fact,” argued Justice Souter, pointing
to the various contextual clues that could illuminate such purpose.107 At the same time, he conceded that a strategic governmental actor could obscure its motive. But this, he argued,
posed no conclusive concern. In the Establishment Clause,
Souter explained, “secret motive stirs up no strife and does
nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents.”108
This last point is ambiguous. It might be read to suggest
that the Establishment Clause is necessarily underenforced.
Alternatively, it might be understood to connote that the
Clause is not concerned with the content of the psychological
state of official actors, but rather with the publicly articulated
understanding of that psychological state. In my view, the first
reading of Justice Souter’s argument is more plausible. To
102
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (quoting Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989)).
103
Id.
104
See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005).
105
See id. at 851–56.
106
See id. at 861.
107
Id. at 862.
108
Id. at 863.
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begin with, as Richard Schragger has observed, “a pervasive
feature of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
that the Court’s stated doctrine is underenforced or is irrelevant to a whole range of arguably pertinent conduct.”109 Justice Souter’s statement simply acknowledges that mundane
fact.
More substantively, imagine a case in which officials enact
a measure for wholly secular reasons, a measure that is reasonably perceived as motivated by favor or disfavor for religion
based on official statements at the time. Imagine further that
the officials can produce persuasive documentary evidence
that in fact secular grounds alone played a role. It is hard to
imagine that the measure would be invalidated because of its
impermissible intent. Rather, the question would be whether
the perceived “endorsement” of religion would constitute an
independent violation of the Establishment Clause.110
A second line of cases, in contrast, concerns measures that
draw a distinction between regulated parties based on denominational affiliation. In the seminal case in this doctrinal
strand, the Court in Larson v. Valente invalidated a Minnesota
statute that drew no facial distinction between denominations,
but rather imposed reporting requirements solely on religious
organizations that solicited more than half of their funds from
nonmembers.111 In so doing, explained the Court, the statute
inscribed “explicit and deliberate distinctions between different
religious organizations” depending on age and size.112 The
Court could have limited its analysis to the face of the statute.
Indeed, some commentators have treated Larson as a case

109
Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause,
89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 585 (2011) (footnote omitted).
110
For the concept of endorsement, see, for example, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring), which asks whether the state
had impermissibly “sen[t] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” See also
Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989) (engaging in an endorsement analysis based on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch). Commentators have argued that the endorsement test is in decline. See Adam M. Samaha,
Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting Principles, 2005 SUP.
CT. REV. 135, 144–58. And some Justices have vigorously attacked the endorsement test on the rare occasions it has been employed to invalidate a measure with
concededly secular purposes. See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists,
Inc., 565 U.S. 994 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
111
456 U.S. 228, 230–31 (1982) (describing Minnesota Charitable Solicitation
Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 309.50–309.61 (2017)).
112
Id. at 246 n.23.
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about “religious classifications” alone.113 But this is a mistake.
The Justices also considered the measure’s “express design—
to burden or favor selected religious denominations led the
Minnesota Legislature to discuss the characteristics of various
sects with a view towards ‘religious gerrymandering.’”114 A denominational preference, Larson suggests, obtains not only
when there is facial discrimination, but also when there is an
intent or “design” to “burden or favor selected religious
denominations.”115
The path of Free Exercise doctrine has been different from
Establishment Clause doctrine. The emergence of discriminatory intent—foreshadowed somewhat in cases such as Larson—came later and more abruptly. Until the end of the
nineteenth century, the Free Exercise Clause was understood
to draw a distinction between impermissible laws that penalized “mere opinion” and those that “reach[ed] actions . . . in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”116 Its
contemporary revival began with the 1963 decision Sherbert v.
Verner, in which the Court invalidated a South Carolina unem113
See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of “Tests”
Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 324 (saying only that the
Court treated a religious classification as suspect).
114
Larson, 456 U.S. at 255 (citation omitted). In other cases involving a denominational preference challenge, however, the Court did limit itself to the face
of the statute. See Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 695
(1989) (reading Larson to apply to cases of “facial preference[s]”). But other courts
have discussed Larson as a nondiscrimination rule. See Children’s Healthcare Is
a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d 1084, 1090 (8th Cir. 2000).
115
For similar statements that seem to turn on government intent, see Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1989), explaining that “[i]t is part of our
settled jurisprudence that ‘the Establishment Clause prohibits government from
abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion, or on
religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization,’”
and Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 605 (1989), saying that “[w]hatever
else the Establishment Clause may mean . . . it certainly means at the very least
that government may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or
creed . . . .”
116
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). But see Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114 (1943) (invalidating a municipal license tax on
the sale of religious pamphlets as an improper “condition to the pursuit of” religious activities). It is noteworthy here that Reynolds and Murdock alike involved
religious minorities—Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses—that were at the time
subject to considerable public contempt and discrimination. See also Kelly Elizabeth Phipps, Marriage and Redemption: Mormon Polygamy in the Congressional
Imagination, 1862–1887, 95 VA. L. REV. 435, 440–42 (2009) (summarizing antiMormon rhetoric in Congress in the 1880s); SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION
(2000) (documenting violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses in the early twentieth
century). It is telling that while the Court reached different results in those two
cases, in neither instance did it identify or discuss the possibility of a discriminatory intent.
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ployment compensation statute that excluded those who declined employment on a Saturday—a measure with an
unequivocal “secular purpose,” as the dissenting Justice
Harlan remarked.117
Sherbert marked the beginning of a sequence of Free Exercise decisions focused on the effects of challenged laws.118 But
intent was not wholly absent from the case law. In 1978, for
example, the Court invalidated a Tennessee prohibition on
ministers serving as delegates to a constitutional convention.119 The Court warned that “government may not as a goal
promote ‘safe thinking’ with respect to religion and fence out
from political participation those, such as ministers, whom it
regards as overinvolved in religion.”120
It was only at the beginning of the 1990s that the Court
turned away from an effects-based framework and embraced
discriminatory intent as an analytic touchstone.121 In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court rejected Free Exercise protection from the incidental burdens on religious liberty created by
neutral, generally applicable rules.122 Like Washington v. Davis’s repudiation of disparate impact in the Equal Protection
context, Smith’s rejection of Sherbert’s effects test was immediately controversial.123 And as in Washington v. Davis, judicial
117

374 U.S. 398, 421 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832 (1989) (referring to the three previous cases in which “denial of unemployment compensation
benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause”); Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n,
480 U.S. 136, 137 (1987) (“The question to be decided is whether Florida’s denial
of un-employment compensation benefits to appellant violates the Free Exercise
Clause.”); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 709 (1981) (asking “whether the
State’s denial of unemployment compensation benefits . . . constituted a violation
of [Petitioner’s] First Amendment right to free exercise of religion”).
119
See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978).
120
Id. at 641 (emphasis added).
121
See Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1269–70
(2008) (concluding that in general the government cannot target individual religious groups in regulations, barring extraordinary circumstances). Intent-based
tests do not exhaust the law of religious liberty. The effects test of Sherbert
remains the nub of statutory religious freedom protections under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012). See
also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 (2014) (applying the RFRA to a federal mandate on employers to provide insurance plans
covering contraception). In addition, the Court has recently suggested identified
religious institutions as bearers of a still-inchoate form of constitutional immunity. See Hosana-Tabor Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709
(2012). Neither of these lines of doctrine hinges on intent.
122
494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
123
Scholars of all stripes attacked Smith in unstinting terms. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10–23 (deriding
the Court’s misconception of neutrality in Smith); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 138–39 (1992) (arguing that
118
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rejection of an effects test hinged on the test’s potentially destabilizing consequences in practice—and not the allure of a competing doctrinal measure.124 Finally, just as in the Equal
Protection context, the Court did not limit instances of discrimination to cases in which a racial classification was present on
the textual surface of a law. Rather, in short order, the Court
explained that the Free Exercise Clause was equally offended
by a facially neutral measure that evinced an impermissible
intent on the part of the relevant institutional decision-maker.
Invalidating a municipal ordinance that prohibited ceremonial
animal sacrifices required by Santeria ritual, but not other like
animal killings, the Court cautioned that “if the object of a law
is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral” but rather in conflict
with the Free Exercise Clause.125
C. Intent and the Protection of Social Groups: A Summary
In the Equal Protection and the First Amendment Religion
Clause contexts, the Supreme Court has moved from a focus
on effects to an analysis trained on government’s discriminatory intent or purpose.126 In the context of race-based claims
and Free Exercise claims, it has made this move for very similar
reasons related to the potential destabilizing effects of an effects test, but with a parallel dearth of close attention to the
embraced alternative. The Establishment Clause, in contrast,
has been characterized by attention to official purpose for
much longer and lacks the animating concern with seismic
repercussions from an effects-based rule. As the Court has
become more politically conservative over the last few decades,
the purpose-focused strand of Establishment Clause jurisprudence has come under increasing pressure. One Justice even
suggested that denominational preferences could be acceptable
provided they tracked the historical dominance of certain
Smith “gives social policy, determined by the State, primacy over the rights of
religious communities”).
124
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (worrying that “[a]ny society adopting [an effects
test for religious liberty claims] would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs, and its
determination to coerce or suppress none of them”). It would be too facile to
respond that the pre-history of Free Exercise jurisprudence demonstrated the
absence of such destabilization. That the Sherbert regime had not destabilized
may well have been a result of the Court maintaining the social equilibrium by
watering down the effects test to make it palatable in practice.
125
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531–32, 546 (1993).
126
See supra subparts I.A–B.
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faiths.127 As this pressure increases, the treatment of racial
and religious classifications is likely to diverge: whereas measures adopted to advance the interests of one race are likely to
remain subject to close constitutional scrutiny, it will probably
be easier for governments to undertake measures to promote
either religion per se or (more usually) majority faiths. Such
measures will include moments of prayer in official government
functions,128 programs of state aid that predictably promote
sectarian institutions,129 and official representations that endorse and promote religion.130 A likely corollary to this development will be increasing space for expressions of disfavor
directed at minority faiths.
It is worth noting that this partial congruence between the
Court’s treatments of race and religion is by no means an obvious or inevitable doctrinal development. Although religion is
sometimes enumerated as one of the suspect classifications
under the Equal Protection Clause,131 antidiscrimination
norms about race and religion have developed along doctrinally
divergent tracks. In part, this is because the historical circum127
See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 889–94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that government need not remain neutral between religion
and nonreligion but can “acknowledg[e] a single Creator”). To date, the rather
startling idea that government can embrace and act upon overt hostility to Buddhism, Hinduism, and other nonmonotheistic faiths has yet to gain formal traction in the case reporters.
128
See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1815 (2014) (upholding rotating prayers at the beginning of town meetings).
129
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–54 (2002) (endorsing school vouchers program, while acknowledging the risk that financial
incentives might skew a program toward religious schools, but ultimately concluding that so long as “neutral, secular” criteria were used no constitutional
problem obtained).
130
The legal treatments of racial and religious discriminations also diverge in
respect to “how far [the Constitution] limits government in affirmatively pursuing
concerns related to religion or race.” Joy Milligan, Religion and Race: On Duality
and Entrenchment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 393, 396–97 (2012) (arguing that the government has more “leeway” when it comes to religion as opposed to race). The Court,
however, has recently started to narrow this difference. See Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017) (striking down
Georgia’s exclusion of religious entities from a generally available funding
program).
131
See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895)
(Field, J., concurring) (suggesting that religion is a suspect classification), aff’d on
reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), superseded on other grounds by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The issue remains unsettled in most courts of
appeals. See Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 2015), as
amended (Feb. 2, 2016) (“Perhaps surprisingly, neither our Court nor the Supreme Court has considered whether classifications based on religious affiliation
trigger heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.” (footnote
omitted)).
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stances of extreme racial stratification have had a distinctive
role in American social and political history that has no precise
religious parallel. Even if the twentieth century was woefully
replete with examples of similarly extreme subjugations of religious minorities in other parts of the world, none is fairly
compared to the peculiar institution. Nevertheless, the design
of an antidiscrimination norm in respect to religion raises
questions akin to those that arise in the design of a racial
equality norm.
II
THE DIVERSITY OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENTS
‘Discriminatory intent’ is not a unitary concept. It is protean and plural. By looking at the species of intent the Court
has recognized, the kinds that it has rejected, and the forms
that simmer away at the periphery of its vision, it is possible to
snap into focus the unavoidable diversity of discriminatory intent as a concept.
Such diversity is not intrinsically a problem: many important terms in constitutional law have multiple meanings. But
the Court has failed to explicitly recognize that impermissible
intent can take one of several forms. As a result, it has failed to
grapple with the imperative of maintaining a diversity of evidentiary approaches. Its selectivity over evidentiary methods—
which is unjustifiable as an effort to match evidentiary tools to
the various forms of observed discriminatory intents—generates highly problematic outcomes.132 It is an implicit tax-andsubsidy regime favoring some groups over others.
This Part steps back from the doctrine and provides a general taxonomy of ‘discriminatory intent’ by drawing on economics, political science, and psychological literature—all bodies of
scholarship that provide more precise and tractable definitions
of discrimination than constitutional law. I argue here that the
term ‘discriminatory intent’ encompasses a wide range of possible operational understandings. I trace five potential understandings of ‘discriminatory intent’ by tacking back and forth
between doctrine and extrinsic social science evidence. Beyond
demonstrating the plasticity of discriminatory intent as a concept, an important dividend from my analysis is that even doctrinal formulations that are generally thought to work
independent of intent (e.g., the anticlassification approach in
Equal Protection) turn out, on closer inspection, to be best
132

See infra subpart IV.A.
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understood as focused on the quality and content of officials’
cognitive processes.
A second analytic payoff is that each conception of discriminatory intent has fuzzy boundaries. It is far from clear which
cases fall within each category. When the Court draws distinctions about what is within and what is beyond the constitutional pale, the reasons for these divisions can be opaque or
inconsistent.
Before turning to these variations, however, it is worth explaining why one well-respected theory of discriminatory intent
does not appear in the taxonomy. In an influential 1989 article, David Strauss offered a “definition” of discriminatory intent
that turned on the analytic device of “reversing the groups,”
and asking whether the same decision would have been made
had the adverse effects of government action fallen on the majority rather than the minority.133 The counterfactual “reversing the groups” test seems to avoid direct inquiry into mental
states, and instead, calls for a judicial reconstruction of what
government actors would have done but for the suspect classification at issue. However, as Strauss observed (in an effort to
demolish the coherence of a discriminatory intent standard),
his proposed counterfactual inquiry still requires a designation
of which features of the background world—including not just
the identity of the parties but also “differences in the size of the
two groups and in their economic and social status, as well as
the[ir] history of relations”—would change, and which would be
held constant, in the hypothetical.134 He thought this an infeasible inquiry.
But assume that the counterfactual is narrowly defined to
focus on a change to the identity of the affected party.135 This
would require a judge to decide whether the official had in fact
been moved by some kind of race-specific reason. They would
therefore have to decide not only which sorts of race-specific
reasons count for constitutional purposes, but also would have
to estimate their causal effect on the relevant official decision
133
Strauss, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 70, at 956–57. The same test
was proposed earlier by Eric Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent,
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 51 (1982).
134
Strauss, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 70, at 971.
135
Audit studies employing testers in retail and housing contexts employ this
assumption. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304, 305 (1995) (finding race
and gender effects by audit studies). But see James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 101, 102 (1998) (noting “fragility” of findings from
audit studies given “alternative assumptions about unobservable variables and
the way labor markets work”).
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being challenged. Reversing the groups—at least when precisely applied to the transaction at stake—hence simply requires the judge to ask if an improper intent is at work. What
‘counts’ as an improper intent remains to be determined.136
The “reversing the groups” lens, at least in its simplest and
most tractable form, is best viewed as an analytic frame for,
rather than as a resolution of, the difficult question of how to
define discriminatory intent.
A. Animus as Discriminatory Intent: Taste-Based
Discrimination
The simplest and perhaps most intuitive form of “discriminatory intent” is the “disutility caused by contact with some
individuals.”137 In a very influential body of work, the economist Gary Becker has termed this “taste-based discrimination”
and deployed it as a conceptual device to model labor market
dynamics with discriminatory employers or coworkers.138
Becker’s model of taste-based discrimination focuses on the
market equilibrium that would result from employers averse to
contact with minority employees and thus willing to pay a premium to employ (equally skilled) non-minority employees. The
dynamic effect of this premium is to create a competitive advantage for non-discriminating firms. The theory hence
predicts that “[a]s long as there is a single nondiscriminatory
employer, all discriminators will be driven out of the market.”139 Of course, the absence of market dynamics, and its
136
Strauss asserts that this captures both conscious and unconscious intent,
but it could also capture instances in which officials make different decisions
because changing ascriptive identity changes the social welfare effects of a decision. See Strauss, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 70, at 960. But it is not clear
how he would treat cases in which race serves as a proxy for a valid character
trait, such as criminality or partisan identity. This problem parallels the principal
barrier to causal identification in many econometric studies. See Kerwin Kofi
Charles & Jonathan Guryan, Studying Discrimination: Fundamental Challenges
and Recent Progress, 3 ANN. REV. ECON. 479, 480–81 (2011) (“The main problem
this line of inquiry confronts is that, in observational data, individuals of different
races may systematically differ with respect to other determinants of labor market
outcomes apart from race, including some that are unobserved.”).
137
GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 15 (2d ed. 1971).
138
Id. at 14 (modeling taste-based discrimination as a “discrimination coefficient,” which “acts as a bridge between money and net costs. Suppose an employer were faced with the money wage rate p of a particular factor; he is assumed
to act as if p(1 + di were the net wage rate, with di as his [discrimination coefficient]
against this factor.”). For a similar treatment of discrimination, see Harold Demsetz, Minorities in the Market Place, 43 N.C. L. REV. 271, 271 (1965), who viewed
“discrimination against” as an “aversion to association” with certain groups.
139
John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1422
(1986).
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substitution by democratic pressures, means that there is no
similar sorting effect at work in government.140
Taste-based discrimination can be roughly translated into
the lexicon of constitutional doctrine as “animus.” A measure
may hence be invalid because its adoption was “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”141 For example,
in striking down Section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), the Court in United States v. Windsor focused on
whether that provision had the “purpose and effect of disproval
of a class.”142 A prohibition on animal sacrifices enacted by the
residents of the Florida city of Hialeah out of “hostility” toward
the Santeria faith similarly rested on constitutionally-infirm
ground.143 Alternatively, animus may enter into the constitutional analysis, not because the decision-maker is biased, but
rather because it acts to the detriment of a person because of
the animus of third parties. For example, a state–court judge
cannot deny custody to a parent solely on the ground that her
new spouse is African-American, such that the child will be
subject to less favorable social treatment once within her
care.144
Windsor, which concerned DOMA’s denial of federal recognition to same-sex marriages, illustrates an important distinction between Becker’s concept of taste-based discrimination
and the “animus” version of discriminatory intent in the constitutional context.145 There are instances in which animus has
taken a laboring oar, the effect of the challenged measure has
been to create physical separation from the protected class as
140
Deborah Hellman offers a different definition of animus focused on the
intent to harm. See Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L.
REV. 895, 903 (2016) (“One way to fail to treat someone as an equal is to intend to
harm him—to adopt a policy that burdens him not merely in spite of this burden
but deliberately because of it.”). I employ Becker’s definition because he attends
to both the intent to harm and the intent to avoid or to deny benefits out of
aversive sentiments.
141
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
142
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013).
143
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 541 (1993).
144
See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect.”). I have characterized Palmore as concerned with taste-based discrimination, but it can also be ranked as a case about statistical discrimination, see infra
subpart II.B, in the sense that the custody decision was based on an estimate of
the expected welfare of the child under different familial arrangements. The race
of the parent, in this view, operated as a proxy for welfare.
145
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (“[G[ranting certiorari on the question of
the constitutionality of § 3 of DOMA;” a federal law that made same-sex marriage
illegal).
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Becker predicted.146 But in Windsor, the central tendency of
the challenged measure was not, as Becker theorized, to discourage contact with the maligned group. To be sure, DOMA’s
effect may well have been to suppress the public expression of
gay unions, and thus diminish the visibility of gay people. But
DOMA’s main intended effect was not to promote physical separation from gays and lesbians. It was rather to delegitimize
same-sex unions (and thus to disparage their participants).
Windsor also points toward an ambiguity in the definition
of animus. The idea of taste-based discrimination connotes an
almost physical repugnance toward the disapproved group. As
Martha Nussbaum has underscored, “disgust” of this form is
plausibly understood to propel what the Court calls animus.147
At the same time, it seems reasonable to think that the federal
law challenged in Windsor was also animated by a sense of
moral disapproval that is not well captured by the concept of
taste-based discrimination. Indeed, in endorsing the right to
same-sex marriage two years after Windsor, the Court “emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere
conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should
not be condoned.”148 Since the Court’s decision finding a right
to same-sex marriage did not rest on a finding of animus, it had
no cause to ask whether a sincerely-held moral theory can
itself revolve around some kind of contempt for, or a demand
for the subordination of, a protected class, such that it is a
form of animus. That question about the perimeter of the “ani-

146

See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985).
See Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667, 683
(2010) (“The idea that same-sex unions will sully traditional marriage therefore
cannot be understood without moving to the terrain of disgust and contamination.”). See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010) (describing the Court’s conception of
animus).
148
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). For a moral argument
that seems to fall within this category, see J.M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of
“Duties to Oneself”: Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437 (1987)
(arguing that anti-gay legislation “may manifest, not contempt, but rather a sense
of the equal worth and human dignity of those people whose conduct is outlawed
precisely on the ground that it expresses a serious misconception of, and actually
degrades, human worth and dignity, and thus degrades their own personal worth
and dignity, along with that of others who may be induced to share or emulate
their degradation”). It seems worth asking here whether Finnis’s position is empirically plausible as a description of widely held views about gays. Cf. Andrew
Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89,
116–17 (1997) (concluding that it is not).
147
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mus” form of discriminatory intent, like others, remains
unexplored.149
B. Impermissible Criteria as Proxies for Licit Ends: The
Problem of Statistical Discrimination (with
Attention to the Double-Effect Doctrine)
The second leading theory of discrimination focuses on the
informational role played by salient characteristics such as
gender or membership in a racial or religious ascriptive
group.150 Economists dissatisfied with Becker’s theory of
taste-based preferences observed that such characteristics
might be valuable if they operated as proxies for other less
observable characteristics. For example, an employer might
believe that African-Americans are less productive than Caucasian workers. As a result, she might employ race as a proxy for
productivity. On this view, employers use race as a proxy for
otherwise unobservable characteristics such as investments
that workers make in terms of habits of action and thought,
steadiness, punctuality, responsiveness, and initiative.151
Studies of labor markets confirm that observed racial differential in wages is due in part to such “statistical
discrimination.”152
A central difference between taste-based discrimination
and statistical discrimination is that the first concerns a state
149
Perhaps the closest decision on point is Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
which upheld the Internal Revenue Service’s decision to deny a religious college
tax-exempt status because of its racially discriminatory policies. See 461 U.S.
574, 581 (1983) (describing discriminatory policies). This suggests that animus
embedded in the rhetorical and ideological matrix of a legible faith system remains nonetheless animus. For a consideration of the same question in the form
of an inquiry into the meaning of the term “bias” in the psychological literature,
see Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, A Justification-Suppression Model of
the Expression and Experience of Prejudice, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 414, 417 (2003).
150
The leading papers are Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism
and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659 (1972), and Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has
Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 96 (1998).
151
See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN
LABOR MARKETS 3, 24–27 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973) [hereinafter
Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination] (“Skin color and sex are cheap sources of
information. Therefore prejudices (in the literal sense of pre-judgments, judgments made in advance of the evidence) about such differentia can be easily
implemented False.”).
152
For powerful evidence from innovative experimental studies, see John A.
List, The Nature and Extent of Discrimination in the Marketplace: Evidence from the
Field, 119 Q.J. ECON. 49, 49–50 (2004). Other studies have identified evidence of
taste-based discrimination by leveraging differences in black-white racial preferences between states. See Kerwin Kofi Charles & Jonathan Guryan, Prejudice and
Wages: An Empirical Assessment of Becker’s The Economics of Discrimination,
116 J. POL. ECON. 773, 773–74 (2008).
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of desire while the second concerns a state of belief.153 A tastebased discriminator has a preference in respect to future states
of affairs, and hence acts with an intention or a purpose to
make those come about. A statistical discriminator has a belief
about the world, whether certain or probabilistic, that provides
a basis for action toward an end that itself has no impermissible content. There is then a logical distinction between the two
forms of discrimination.
At the same time, these two categories are not absolutely
distinct from one another in practice. Consider, for example,
the idea of a stereotype, a generally pejorative term used to
condemn certain generalizations, and in particular generalizations with a negative character.154 Some stereotypes may be
based on spurious correlations, or reflect the outcomes of third
parties’ prejudice (e.g., a belief that a certain racial minority is
lazy may be premised on comparatively higher unemployment
rates that in turn are predicated on animus). Others may be
based on sound empirical foundations. And there is an intermediate category in which the generalization is based on a
morally flawed reading of available data. Taste-based and statistical discrimination, in short, are not acoustically separate
from each other in practice.
It is not immediately obvious why the Constitution should
be concerned with the epistemic use of an impermissible
ground at all, provided the government’s ends are legitimate
and its beliefs are untainted by animus. The case law contains
only fragments of an answer. One theory might be that it is
difficult or impossible to distinguish between taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination, so that the latter
must be prohibited along with the former. In Justice
O’Connor’s words, we might conclude that taste-based discrimination is “potentially so harmful to the entire body politic,” whereas “racial characteristics so seldom provide a
relevant basis for disparate treatment,” that the two must be
treated alike.155 Her claim here may be that statistical discrimination is so seldom effective, while taste-based discrimination
is so easily hidden, that a broad prophylactic rule is required.
153
See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463,
476 (1992) (drawing this distinction).
154
See FREDRICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES & STEREOTYPES 3–4 (2003).
As Schauer observes, “judgment without generalization is impossible,” such that
it cannot be that all generalizations used as heuristics are impermissible. Id. at
214–15.
155
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
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Neither the Court nor commentators, however, have ever
substantiated either element of Justice O’Connor’s logic. Nor is
either element obviously true. The fact that race (for example)
seems to provide information for employers,156 suggests that it
may be epistemically useful in other policy contexts—for example, the provision of protection against private animus. At the
same time, it is far from clear that we cannot distinguish statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination in practice.
Alternatively, a constitutional prohibition on statistical discrimination might be justified by analogy to the dynamic effects
of statistical discrimination on human capital acquisition for
labor markets. As Glenn Loury has pointed out, the existence
of statistical discrimination entails that the purportedly
subordinate class (e.g., African-Americans in the labor market)
can expect to receive lower returns on investments in education.157 A dynamic effect of statistical discrimination by race in
current labor markets, Loury observed, is to disincentivize the
acquisition of human capital by African-Americans.158 The
generalizations upon which statistical discrimination are predicated, even if false at their inception, become self-confirming
over time. The question is then whether a similar dynamic
arises in the constitutional context when official distinctions,
inaccurate in their inception, provoke behaviors that in turn
render the distinctions increasingly sticky over time. For example, if police falsely believe that a certain race is more violent, they may treat members of that race with greater
harshness and force as a prophylactic; in time, this treatment
will induce the very violence that was feared and used as
justification.
It is not at all clear that doctrines under the First and the
Fourteenth Amendment, however, evince any consciousness of
the possibility of such dynamic effects of law. As a result, the
justification for including discrimination as proxy within the
constitutional prohibition (as opposed to simply outside the domain of decent, sensible policy) remains to be stated.

156

See List, supra note 152, at 49–50.
See GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 87–88 (2002).
158
See id. at 179–84; see also Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, supra note
151, at 24–27 (noting the possibility of such adaptive human capital investments); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1626 (1991)
[hereinafter Strauss, Racial Discrimination in Employment] (“Statistical discrimination can lead to inefficiently low investment in human capital among members
of the group that is discriminated against.”).
157
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Perhaps fittingly, doctrinal treatment of statistical discrimination—wherein the relevant trait is deployed as a proxy for
some otherwise licit end—has a hesitant and equivocal quality.
The border between permissible and prohibited states of mind
here seems to slice between cases that are more alike than
different.159 On the one hand, where race is used as a proxy for
partisanship in the redistricting context, the Constitution is
squarely implicated.160 Similarly, when race is deployed as a
proxy for risk when managing a carceral population, that decision also elicits strict scrutiny.161 Further, when gender is
used as a proxy for a trait, based on some stereotype about
men and women, the relevant law receives heightened scrutiny.162 On the other hand, when race is employed as a trait in
police suspect descriptions, federal courts have not expended
significant effort in considering their constitutionality.163 Insofar as contact with the police is the modal form of interaction
between the state and certain racial minorities (or, at least,
men within that minority group) in urban contexts,164 this lacuna is a significant one.
Not only is the justification for a constitutional prohibition
on statistical discrimination unclear, its current borders are
also theoretically problematic. Consider two cases: In the first,
the normatively salient trait is used as a proxy for a licit end. In
the second, an official takes a decision aiming at a wholly licit
end by relying on a lawful classification but does so with the
knowledge that the adverse effects of that decision will fall
159
The border between taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination is also less crisp than generally believed. A generalization deployed for the
purpose of statistical discrimination might itself be a function of animus against a
given group, or otherwise go awry in a number of different ways. Cf. Cass R.
Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 21, 26
(1991) (noting a variety of forms of irrational prejudices, including “(a) a belief that
members of a group have certain characteristics when in fact they do not, (b) a
belief that many or most members of a group have certain characteristics when in
fact only a few do, and (c) reliance on fairly accurate group-based generalizations
when more accurate classifying devices are available”). Some of these generalizations, however accurate, might also reflect taste-based discrimination.
160
See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 n.1 (2017) (“A plaintiff succeeds at [the first stage of the analysis] even if the evidence reveals that a legislature elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other goals,
including political ones.”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914 (1995) (“[T]he
precise use of race as a proxy” for “political interest[s]” is prohibited).
161
See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
162
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
163
See R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1077–78 (2001).
164
See Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159,
162–63 (2015).
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largely upon a protected class. What makes the latter case
interesting is the contingent background fact of a high correlation between the lawful classification selected and the impermissible classification. For example, take the decision to
reward military veterans with employment-related preferences,
or the decision to intensify coercive street policing in urban
neighborhoods with high levels of street-centered narcotics
transactions. These are both cases in which a reasonable decision maker cannot but be aware that their decision is predicated on a criterion that is functionally indistinguishable
from—and, indeed, perhaps from the outside observationally
equivalent to—a decision based on the impermissible criterion.
In one case, it is gender, in another race.165 What then is the
difference between taking aim directly at a protected class, and
taking aim at a classification that substantially and predictably
overlaps with that class?
In the ‘type two’ cases described above, the Court has
found no constitutional infirmity.166 This nonliability rule, first
announced in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, a case involving the gendered effects of veterans’ employment-related benefits,167 tracks the Thomist doctrine of double effect. That
argument in turn was reintroduced to modern philosophy by
Philippa Foot. It holds, in rough paraphrase, that an “oblique”
intention in respect to an impermissible goal is not usually
fatal to the morality of an action aimed at an otherwise proper
end.168
But should all cases of double-effect really be ranked as
outside the domain of constitutional concern? Setting aside
the difficult proof problems that might arise in determining
what criterion a decision-making official in fact employed, the
question is a more different one than judges or commentators
seemingly realize.
There are numerous significant commonalities, as well as
some differences, between the Feeney scenario and plainly im165
This problem is distinct from the cases in which statistical discrimination
and animus turn out to be observationally equivalent. See Jody D. Armour, Race
Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 791 (1994).
166
See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (proof of discriminatory purpose requires showing that the government decision-maker “selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely
‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”).
167
See id. at 259.
168
See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double
Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 25 (1978)
(distinguishing between “direct” and “oblique” intentions).
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permissible uses of statistical discrimination. For one thing,
neither involves a goal that itself has an impermissible character (e.g., when people are targeted for police coercion on the
basis of an a priori belief that criminality is concentrated within
certain racial minorities). In both cases, the official is likely
aware that the impermissible criterion (race, ethnicity, or religion) is entangled, directly or obliquely, with the means elected
to accomplish the licit goal. What divides the cases is the presence of a very specific and finely drawn form of intentionality:
in one case, the official consciously deploys that criterion,
whereas in the other case, the official knowingly ignores the
role of the normatively fraught classification as a marker of
practical social difference in the world. The intent to use (say)
race as a proxy is constitutionally distinct from the decision to
use a functional substitute for race. But the moral quality and
consequences of those decisions track each other more closely
than the doctrine suggests.169
Let’s accept the salience of the double-effect doctrine as a
matter of constitutional law. Still, it seems worth noticing that
in both legal and philosophical treatments of specific doubleeffect cases, there is no hard-and-fast boundary between direct
and oblique intentions. What is clear in theory, in other words,
is murkier in real life. Philosophers do not morally excuse the
terrorist, for example, on the ground that he intended only
political change, whereas the deaths he caused were merely
obliquely intended.170 Nor should they.
Even if full information is available, the distinction between
direct and oblique intention must be drawn on the basis of
objective construals of intents, not the “idiosyncrasies of particular individuals and their willful or perverse constructions of
the purposes of their actions.”171 This principle is akin to (although not precisely the same as) the familiar axiom of the law
that people are understood to intend the natural and foreseeable consequences of their actions.172 If individuals’ subjective
169
Both Washington v. Davis and Emp’t Div. v. Smith pointed to the practical
consequences of an effects rule as a reason to limit liability to cases of intentional
discrimination. Feeney makes no such appeal to practicality although the case
can readily be understood in the same terms.
170
G.E.M. Anscombe, War and Murder, reprinted in MORAL PROBLEMS: A COLLECTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 280–81 (James Rachels ed., 1971).
171
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1135, 1155 (2003).
172
See, e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 286
(1958) (“There is no legal difference between desiring or intending a consequence
as following from your conduct, and persisting in your conduct with a knowledge
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accounts of their own purposes controls, intent doctrine would
rarely rule an action out of constitutional bounds.
But if the boundary between direct and oblique intention is
necessarily drawn on the basis of an objective construal of
intent, then the double-effect scenarios covered by Feeney necessarily raise the question of when an otherwise licit criterion is
so closely and predictably correlated with a normatively problematic criterion that the same constitutional concerns are
triggered.173 To my knowledge, courts have not engaged in this
inquiry. They simply have not recognized the need for objective
construals of intentionality in the way that philosophers have.
To the extent the double-effect doctrine itself provides a
basis for the rule, moreover, a powerful challenge by T.M.
Scanlon holds that what matters in such cases is not the quality of the actor’s intentions, but rather the availability of objective justifications for the specific action.174 As I understand it,
Scanlon’s framing would not necessarily treat the veterans’
benefits case differently from the use of race as a proxy for
carceral risk (although, depending on the specific justificatory
facts available, it may or may not yield a different distribution
of outcomes). But the point here is that both cases would be
analyzed under a parallel rubric and would stand or fall on the
same grounds.
C. Anticlassification: Race and Religious Classifications as
Discriminatory Intent
Some bases for government decisions inflict such grave
dignitary and stigmatic harm by dint of their history or because
of present circumstances that their deployment can never be
justified by balancing the costs and benefits.175 This logic supthat the consequence will inevitably follow from it, though not desiring that
consequence.”).
173
Feeney recognized this problem but provided a non sequitur by way of
answer. According to Justice O’Connor, the inevitability of a discriminatory effect
can lead to a “strong inference” of discriminatory intent—unless “the impact is
essentially an unavoidable consequence of a legislative policy that has in itself
always been deemed to be legitimate.” Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
n.25 (1979). But then the legislature has chosen, among many policy ends, one
that imposes “unavoidable” and symmetrical costs to a protected group—which
itself might be constitutionally problematic. The Feeney Court simply assumes
that it is not.
174
T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS 1–37 (2008); see also Fallon, supra note
48, at 564–65 (discussing Scanlon’s approach). I am grateful to Andrew Verstein
for discussion of this point.
175
There might also be a deontic justification for an anticlassification rule.
That is, it is always per se wrong for an official to take account of a suspect
classification in their reasoning. This argument would require, of course, some

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN503.txt

1252

unknown

Seq: 42

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

30-AUG-18

12:31

[Vol. 103:1211

ports an “anticlassificatory” approach to Equal Protection or
the Religion Clause. This approach has been understood to
focus on the formal content of the formal enunciations (i.e., a
statute, regulation, or directive) issued by official actors of the
formal criterion used in an orally-delivered order. But I shall
argue that it sweeps more broadly.
Most notably, the Court has deployed some version of an
anticlassificatory lens in present Equal Protection law in respect to race. That clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
summarized as a means of “protecting individuals from the
harm of categorization by race.”176 But it has taken a different
path, in contrast, in its treatment of gender under the Equal
Protection Clause by dint of its focus on false and degrading
stereotypes—a concern that reflects a distinct concern with
misguided statistical discrimination.177 In the Religion Clause
context, the Justices have also taken a mixed path in which an
anticlassification logic plays a part, but does not explain all the
cases. Hence, Douglas Laycock has identified “formal neutrality,” or “the mere absence of religious classifications,” as one
element of Religion Clause doctrine.178 Formal neutrality entails that financial aid be distributed in terms that make no
distinction between religious and nonreligious entities and
would prohibit regulatory exceptions exclusively drawn for religious actors.179 Both of these positions are found in current
jurisprudence.180 There are, however, many other areas of Re-

explanation of why suspect classifications are wrong regardless of consequence.
See infra text accompanying note 190 (discussing one possibility).
176
Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1287 (2011)
[hereinafter Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization].
177
See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010) (noting the dominance of stereotypes in this jurisprudence and tracing its etiology).
178
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
313, 320 (1996); accord Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999–1001 (1990). For a defense of formal neutrality in the Establishment Clause context, see Philip B.
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961).
179
See Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, supra note 178, at 1001.
180
See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct.
2012, 2024 (2017) (nondiscriminatory funding); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1989) (religion-based regulatory exceptions). But cf. Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 338–39 (1987) (finding an exception to Title VII for religious groups).

R
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ligion Clause jurisprudence that formal neutrality does not
explain.181
An anticlassification rule seems at first blush to fall
outside the domain of discriminatory intent. That rule, viewed
superficially, simply demands that judges examine the formal
content of the rule of decision deployed by a government actor.
But this exclusion is too quick for a number of reasons. As an
initial matter, anticlassification rules must bite on the cognitive
content of government decision-makers’ behavior, in addition
to the formal context of laws and regulations, to have any practical effect in our system of constitutional adjudication. That
is, an anticlassification approach might be understood as a
directive that officials never deploy, in their own thinking, the
relevant prohibited ground as a criterion for decision, whether
openly or otherwise.
This formulation focuses on the content of the rules subjectively applied by the official and asks whether the cognitive
process deployed to reach a decision, whether articulated or
not, turned at any point on an impermissible classification. In
this sense, it is directly concerned with reasons an official in
fact has for acting (i.e., their intentions) and not the formal
content of the law. Consistent with this, it would seem that in
most cases, a government classification is not subject to challenge unless it is actually applied by an official to a litigant: The
mere fact of its existence is (rarely) enough.182
Moreover, the most forcefully tendered alternative justification for an anticlassification rule, which is framed in terms of
its effects on citizens, rather than officials’ intentions, turns
out to be implausible on even superficial inspection. Speaking
of the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Thomas has argued
that “[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race
not only because those classifications can harm favored races
or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every
time the government places citizens on racial registers and
makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it

181

See, e.g., Hosana-Tabor Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 709 (2012) (creating a regulatory exception for some religious entities).
182
For example, in racial gerrymandering cases, voters who live outside the
allegedly gerrymandered district generally lack Article III standing. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2015) (citing United
States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995)). Establishment Clause cases are a
limited exception to this general rule. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
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demeans us all.”183 (As an aside, note that although this is
victim-focused language, the italicized language is couched in
terms of officials’ intentions—and not on the semantic quality
of the relevant law or regulation—even as the final clause is
focused on the experience of those subjected to classifications).
Yet taken as a literal account of subjective experiences of
those subject to impermissible classifications, Justice
Thomas’s argument is not true. It is plain that members of the
polity have widely divergent responses to different government
acts even when they do not implicate a suspect classification.184 Not all members of the polity feel demeaned when a
racial, ethnic, or religious classification is deployed. Some, to
the contrary, feel immense pride. Indeed, it is not even clear
that all those disadvantaged by the use of such a criterion
should feel slighted (as in the use of affirmative action, for
example, where other psychological reactions are both plausible and likely).185 As Lourey notes, “the simple fact that a
person classifies others (or herself, for that matter) in terms of
‘race’ is in itself neither a good nor a bad thing.”186 Where it is
a source of identification, belonging, and self-respect, such labels have a range of use beyond disparagement.
The appeal of anticlassification thus cannot hinge on the
subjective and perhaps idiosyncratic experiences of those who
perceive the government acting and thereby form judgments of
their political standing. Indeed, it is striking that many policies
that are challenged under an anticlassification rule do not use
the prohibited criterion in a highly salient and public fashion.
Paradoxically, that criterion is salient only because of litigation
challenging it.187 There is something troublingly circular about
183
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). For a collection and critique of the
seminal opinions in the race context, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (1991).
184
Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
943, 954–58 (1995) (recognizing that government actions may have different
meanings for various observers and that government); Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1584 (2012) (noting that
“observers might perceive an appearance differently, disagree over whether and
how it should be assigned meaning, or value the same meaning differently”).
185
See Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1, 17 (2000) (“Affirmative action expresses inclusion, not exclusion.
While individual white applicants who would be admitted under a race-blind
system are in fact excluded (in other words, they do suffer concrete harm), the
best understanding of the practice in our culture today is not that white students
are not welcome or worthy of admission . . . .”).
186
LOURY, supra note 157, at 19.
187
See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016) (describing
the manner in which the University of Texas took account of race as one of many
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building the constitutional case for anticlassification on public
perceptions, which themselves are functions of constitutional
litigation.
If subjective perceptions of legitimacy and worth are in
practice variously affected by suspect classifications, it is hard
to see why a categorical rule against them could be warranted.
The Court would have to make an empirical weighing of the
positive and negative reactions elicited by a government policy.
Hence, when the Court in 2005 said that “[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race,” it has to be understood as making not just a
normative but also an empirical claim.188 Yet the relevant decision contained no empirical evidence and no weighing of the
costs of demoralization against the benefits of recognition.189
So the disparagement-centered explanation of the anticlassification rule is hard to sustain given observed empirical facts.
But on that score, the jurisprudence is characterized by
silence.
Accordingly, the logic of anticlassification must reflect a
victim-independent judgment that there are normative
grounds for objecting to the use of a specific criterion in official
decision-making. These grounds cannot turn on the actual
subjective experiences of those who perceive the government
action.
The anticlassification concern, in this light, is better understood as being triggered by the occurrence of an impermissible criterion in the government’s decisional process, whether
overt or not. It focuses on the cognitive content of governmental deliberation. In other words, it is as much a matter of
“discriminatory intent” as taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination.
Framed in these terms, the anticlassification rule might be
better supported by the argument that impermissible classifications embody or elicit objectionable forms of official inten“special circumstances” that themselves were only one of three prongs for deliberation—albeit not in a high-salience way).
188
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
748 (2007).
189
While the decision discussed the costs of racial classification, the benefits
of recognition are not included in the analysis. See id. at 745 (“If the need for the
racial classifications embraced by the school districts is unclear, even on the
districts’ own terms, the costs are undeniable.”). Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, noted that some scholars believe that racial classifications result in educational benefits. Justice Thomas, however, found that the empirical evidence is
inconclusive. See id. at 761 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In reality, it is far from
apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits.”).
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tionality. Consistent with this intuition, some Justices have
offered analogies to Nazi race laws when discussing racial classifications.190 These usually emotive comparisons suggest that
the Justices perceive some intrinsic, acontextual wrong in such
classifications that goes beyond the mere subjective perceptions of those regulated by the law. Ascertaining whether this
intuition is plausible is beyond my remit here, but it cannot go
without comment that equating a racial gerrymander designed
to create majority-minority districts in North Carolina to the
1935 Nuremberg race laws is hardly self-evident—except, perhaps, as evidence of a want of judgment on the speaker’s part.
Just as the boundaries of taste-based and statistical discrimination are fuzzy, so too the plausible domain of the anticlassification rule is not as clear as might first appear. Again,
it is useful to consider the use of a formally permissible criterion that is predictably likely to track the use of an impermissible criterion (e.g., a claim that is made about race in relation to
criminality). If the use of the formally impermissible criterion is
so “demean[ing]”191 as to be beyond the constitutional pale,
then it seems at least worth asking whether a close proxy for
that impermissible classification would trigger some of the
same objections. For example, when the Court allows the loosening of Fourth Amendment protections in a “high crime area,”
it is possible to discern an arguably objectionable proxy for race
at work.192 It is hard to see why this term should not also be
condemned for the spillover stigmatic effect that results from
its implicit invocation of race—just as it is hard to see why
reasons for prohibiting the use of impermissible classifications
as a proxy for licit ends do not spill over and apply to doubleeffect cases such as Feeney.193 In this way, the logic of anticlassification is not easily confined as a matter of logic to
cases in which the impermissible criterion appears in the gov-

190
See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 n.1 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (referring to the “First Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship
Law of November 14, 1935” as well as the “Population Registration Act No. 30 of
1950, Statutes of the Republic of South Africa” (citations omitted)); cf. Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (stating that majority-minority voting districting
“bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid”).
191
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
192
See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (allowing searches based
on lower quantum of suspicion in a “high crime area”). For some evidence that the
term “high crime area” is operationalized in racialized terms, see Jeff Fagan & Ben
Grunwald, Addicted to Wardlow (June 2017) (on file with author).
193
See supra text accompanying notes 166–73.
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ernment’s decisional process. Experience, of course, is another
matter entirely.
D. The Intent to Promote One’s Status by Denigrating
Others: The Group-Status Production Theory of
Discrimination
Neither taste-based discrimination nor statistical discrimination explain the manifold ways in which impermissible criterion are reflected in, and can motivate, the law. In the
antebellum South, for example, races mixed physically because of the use of house slaves and because of white male
sexual predations against African-American women.194 Subsequently, neither laws barring miscegenation, nor criminal statutes imposing higher penalties on interracial rather than
intraracial fornication, are readily explained by taste-based
discrimination.195 Indeed, to the extent that discrimination is
modeled as an aversion to contact with another group, one
might think that the law would need to use greater penalties
against intraracial fornication so as to engender effective
deterrence.
A third theory of discriminatory intent concerns state action that is animated not by disgust or by epistemic deficiency,
but by the need to produce and reinforce status hierarchies
between different social groups. As refined by Richard McAdams, the theory of group-status production understands discrimination as entailing “processes by which one . . . group
seeks to produce esteem for itself by lowering the status of
another group.”196 Esteem elicits more practical benefits such
as the “set of assumptions, privileges, and benefits that accompany” membership in the high status group and that constitute
a valuable asset to be “affirmed, legitimated, and protected by
194
See EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 328,
429 (1993).
195
For examples of such laws, see Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1883),
which upheld a fornication statute that imposed greater penalties on interracial
acts. See also Peter Wallenstein, Interracial Marriage on Trial: Loving v. Virginia,
in RACE ON TRIAL: LAW AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 177 (Annette Gordon-Reed
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (reviewing history of miscegenation statutes in
American law).
196
Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1044 (1995);
see also George A. Akerlof, Discriminatory, Status-Based Wages Among TraditionOriented, Stochastically Trading Coconut Producers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 265, 265–66
(1985) (offering a slightly distinct theory of discrimination focused on group
status).
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the law.”197 On McAdams’s account of racial preferences, antidiscrimination law respecting racial identity is hence justified
because it “rais[es] the costs of subordination . . . [to] induce
people to switch to socially productive, or at least socially benign, means of acquiring status.”198
The canon of First and Fourteenth Amendment law contains traces of concern with group-status production. In the
Equal Protection context, there are a number of decisions that
are hard to elucidate without it. For example, in invalidating
Virginia’s miscegenation statute, the Court relied not only on
the fact that the law contained an explicit racial classification,
but also on the “fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial
marriages involving white persons[, which] demonstrates that
the racial classifications must stand on their own justification,
as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”199 A
similar concern might be glimpsed in the Establishment Clause
jurisprudence of endorsement—a non-intent-based test—insofar as it is concerned with the creation of “preferred,” and by
implication disfavored, classes of citizens.200
Despite these hints, the theory of group-status production
remains at the periphery of constitutional antidiscrimination
law. The rare instances in which the Court understands a
government action as part of a more general strategy of castemaking are outliers. A constitutional jurisprudence of status
production would require stable and reliable tools for picking
out measures intended to create hierarchical differences in status. As with dynamic accounts of statistical discrimination as
a motor of social differentiation, it is not clear that the groupstatus production model is reconcilable with the narrowly
transactional focus of most constitutional doctrine.
Perhaps the most plausible doctrinal entailment of the
group-status production is what Reva Siegel calls the “antibalkanization” theory of Equal Protection, which “assesses
the constitutionality of government action by asking about the
kind of polity it creates.”201 In particular, Siegel’s reconstruc197
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1713
(1993); see also DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING
OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991).
198
McAdams, supra note 196, at 1078.
199
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); accord Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute from sodomy prohibitions on the basis that the latter had a
“racially discriminatory purpose”).
200
See Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (citation omitted).
201
Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 176, at 1301.
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tion of an antibalkanization theme, largely drawing on recent
opinions by Justice Kennedy, draws attention to the possibility
that remedies for racial injustice will themselves exacerbate
intergroup resentment, and thereby entrench corrosive divisions within society.202 In this fashion, it is conscious of competition for status between social groups, although it is focused
on political consequences rather than discriminatory intent,
and hence does not fit into my typology here.
It is nevertheless worth noting that antibalkization may
well be somewhat fragile as a model for judicial intervention.
As Siegel notes, the logic of antibalkanization can lead judges
to curtail the state’s ability to remedy pervasive socioeconomic
disparities.203 In practice, this might leave society fractured
and unsettled. This would be an ironic consequence in the
Equal Protection Clause context, since the latter was crafted in
response to deficient state protection against private discrimination.204 Another problem is that judges are unlike economists working with Loury’s nuanced model of underinvestment
in human capital. They have no data, and only bare intuitions
about when and how state action exacerbates racial
fragmentation.
Given that the Justices tend to give only cursory and aphoristic recognition of this causal inference problem, it seems
quite unlikely that they will accurately predict which instances
of discrimination have pernicious, self-confirming effects in the
long term without expert aid and a humble attentiveness to
sociological evidence.
E. The Marginal Cases of Bad Intent: The Relation of
Unconscious Bias and Structural Discrimination to
Discriminatory Intent
The two final, and most marginal, theories of discriminatory intent concern unconscious bias and the neglect of structural forms of discrimination. To be very clear, I do not think
that either of these is a core case of impermissible discriminatory intent. My reason for including them here is a bit more
subtle: Both, in my view, are conceptually and practically con202
See id. at 1302–03 (arguing that antibalkanization “vindicates constitutional values by authorizing representative institutions to promote equality, while
imposing on courts responsibility for constraining the form of political interventions so as to ameliorate resentments they may engender”).
203
See id. at 1359.
204
See CURRIE, supra note 63, at 349, 349 n.143; see also John Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1436–51
(1992).
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gruent with core conceptions of discriminatory intent. They are
the ambiguous limit cases of discriminatory intent in the sense
that both turn on the risk that government decision-makers
will take account of an impermissible ground of decision even
in the absence of an explicit instruction or desire to do so.
Hence, I lump them together here for convenience’s sake.
Consider first implicit bias. A large body of psychological
studies suggests that, at least with respect to race, “[i]mplicit
biases[,] implicit attitudes and stereotypes . . . are both pervasive (most individuals show evidence of some biases), and large
in magnitude.”205 Studies of implicit bias extend to high-salience situations where the use of government authority is especially controversial. For example, psychological studies of
police use of firearms using simulated targets of a different race
suggest that unarmed African-American targets are erroneously shot more often than unarmed white targets. In contrast,
armed white targets are mistakenly spared more often than
armed African-American targets.206 Studies of sentencing decisions find similar distortions.207
Implicit bias is, by definition, not conscious—and hence is
distinct from the other strands of discriminatory intent canvassed above—but it is a function of cognitive processes and
categories that determine intentional actions.208 This psychological quality means that it is not cleanly distinct from other
kinds of relevant intentionality. Moreover, taste-based discrimination that is costly to express openly may be rearticulated as implicit appeals to the aversive stereotypes. That is,
there may be a sublimation of the discriminatory intent that is
205
Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias
and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 473 (2010) (summarizing studies). But see F.
Oswald et al., Using the IAT to Predict Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: Small
Effect Sizes of Unknown Societal Significance, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 562, 565–67 (2015) (casting doubt on external validity of studies).
206
Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1314, 1319 (2002). Analysis of aggregate data concerning the use of police force
has generated some evidence of such bias in action. See, e.g., Correll et al., supra
note 22, at 207 (reporting findings from an empirical study, including a finding
that police officers were quicker to shoot armed African-Americans than they were
whites); Justin Nix et al., A Bird’s Eye View of Civilians Killed by Police in 2015, 16
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 319, 324–26 (2017) (providing evidence of implicit bias
in police killings of civilians).
207
See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 383, 383–84 (2006).
208
See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1504–08
(2005).
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commonly taken as a conscious political strategy.209 To the
extent that implicit bias becomes a (sometimes conscious) substitute for overt taste-based discrimination in the political and
public sphere,210 there is an obvious case for considering its
regulation under the rubric of discriminatory intent.211
In contrast, structural discrimination concerns the “interplay between individuals and the[ir] larger organizational environments in which they work.”212 In its most common
articulation, it is used to characterize the role of race in American society (although its terms are readily transposed to gender, sexuality, or ethnicity). Its principal theorists seek to
describe and critique a “racialized social system” in which “economic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially
structured by the placement of actors in racial categories or
races.”213 Importantly, those theorists point out that it is not
easy to characterize social action within such a system as discriminatory vel non: When the regulatory principles of social
status, and hence the governmental systems for allocating
benefits or burdens on the basis of status or desert—presuppositions that in insolation would be quickly labeled discriminatory—are so pervasively and subtly broadcasted through the
frames of social action, they cannot be avoided without con209
See TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT
MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY 3–27 (2001) (discussing reliance by elected
politicians and candidates upon implicit messages of racial subordination embedded into racially neutral sounding language).
210
But cf. Gowder, supra note 1, at 340 (noting the simultaneous “social
unacceptability and yet persistence of some explicitly racist views”).
211
Another reason focuses on the culpable failure of state actors to address a
well-known bias that is not immediately apparent, but available to inspection
upon introspection. Given that it has long been clear that “private actors of good
faith can voluntarily adopt best practices that decrease implicit bias and its manifestations,” it is not clear that the failure to act prophylactically is an innocent
one. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1494 (2005).
212
Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate:
Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 857 (2007).
213
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 465, 469 (1996) (defining a “racialized social system” as one
in which “economic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially structured
by the placement of actors in racial categories or races”). There is a range of
conceptual formulations of this system. Compare MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT,
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 84 (2d ed.
1994) (describing the racial order in the U.S. as “equilibrated by the state—
encoded in law, organized through policy-making, and enforced by a repressive
apparatus”), with MUSTAFA EMIRBAYER & MATTHEW DESMOND, THE RACIAL ORDER 88
(2015) (“Racial fields are organized in terms of the structure of distribution of
different types of capitals or assets, the most important being specifically racial
capital.”).
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scious effort.214 To show an improper bias on this view is to
proceed without accounting for the ways in which a classification already organizes access to social, financial, and political
resources. Intentions are thus understood not only in terms of
means and ends, but also in terms of omissions and suppressions arising in an already racialized social structure.
Judicial doctrine under the First and the Fourteenth
Amendments largely ignores implicit bias and structural exclusion.215 Doctrine in both domains is neutral in respect to the
specific ascriptive identity in play. Formally, that is, the doctrine is supposed to be applied evenhandedly whether the complaining litigant is Christian or Muslim, white or AfricanAmerican.216 Yet the thrust of both the implicit bias and structural exclusion theories is not to mistake surface neutrality for
practically equal treatment. Each theory, in different ways,
posits dynamic forces (psychological or social) that render formally neutral legal arrangements functionally inegalitarian. By
resisting any asymmetries in the treatment of protected
groups, however, constitutional doctrine sets its face against
acknowledgement of both theories.
Yet it is far from clear that the theories of discriminatory
bias that underlie the doctrine support this exclusion. Tastebased discrimination posits quite simply that a person “dislikes
members of a minority group and does not want to associate
with them.”217 Becker’s model of labor markets characterized
by taste-based discrimination, like most rational choice models, focuses on how preferences are expressed through market
interactions. The model does not require market participants’
articulation or even acknowledgment of discriminatory intent.
Conveying the same preferences in coded, yet legible, ways
seems both possible and probable. Hence, there is no theoreti214
Cf. R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, & Lee Ross, Discrimination
and Implicit Bias in A Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2006)
(“Pervasive racial inequality also complicates the question of what it would mean
to be racially unbiased.”).
215
The Court, however, has recognized the possibility of unconscious bias in
construing statutory anti-discrimination schemes. In a recent decision construing the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), for example, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
observed that “disparate-impact liability under the FHA also plays a role in uncovering discriminatory intent: It permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious
prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate
treatment.” Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015).
216
But see Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 176,
at 1287 (noting that white plaintiffs fare differently from minority plaintiffs in
gaining access to the courts).
217
Strauss, Racial Discrimination in Employment, supra note 158, at 1621.
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cal reason to exclude implicit bias from a doctrine of discriminatory intent modeled on taste-based discrimination. And
there is no dispute that discriminatory intent, for constitutional purposes, includes taste-based discrimination.
Similarly, there is no a priori reason for a doctrinal scheme
crafted around statistical discrimination to exclude cases in
which implicit bias has a dispositive causal effect. For example, there is powerful evidence from audit studies of private
hiring decisions that employers use race as a proxy for criminality notwithstanding the availability of other information
about skills and employment history.218 Similar studies find
that apparently gay applicants are treated differently than
equally qualified heterosexual men at the threshold hiring
stage, especially when employers seek “stereotypically male
heterosexual traits.”219 Yet these effects from statistical discrimination—in which negative inferences are drawn in respect
to expected job performance from the possession of static, nonperformative traits—do not in any way depend upon employer
awareness of their stereotypical cognitive process. To the contrary, it seems plausible to posit that employers who do not
recognize the stereotypical bases for their decisional process
will be even more prone to fall back unconsciously on wellworn templates of social action in making decisions than those
who are conscious of such stereotypes’ temptation. To the extent that statistical discrimination motivates the constitutional
doctrine of discriminatory intent, therefore, there is no reason
to exclude notions of implicit bias.
In short, the doctrinal boundary between conscious forms
of discriminatory intent and unreflective forms—especially
when a function of unconscious processes—cannot be derived
from underlying theories of discriminatory intent. It is rather
the Court that is responsible for gerrymandering the operative
doctrinal conception of bias to carve out these consequential
theories of discrimination in ways that want for theoretical
justification.
F. Accounting for the Diversity of Discriminatory Intents
“Discriminatory intent”—which is a key organizing term in
Equal Protection and the Religion Clause—is not a single concept. Rather, by drawing on economic, sociological, and psy218
See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 93–96 (2007).
219
András Tilcsik, Pride and Prejudice: Employment Discrimination against
Openly Gay Men in the United States, 117 AM. J. SOC. 586, 587–88 (2011).
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chological studies, this Part has illuminated the plural
conceptions of bias simultaneously at work in (or at the margins of) current doctrine. These conceptions of bias operate as
complements in (or at the margins of) current doctrinal arrangements, rather than as substitutes: Different judicial applications of the Constitution’s protections for vulnerable social
groups alternatively invoke taste-based discrimination when
invalidating municipal restrictions on Santeria, notions of statistical discrimination when policing political redistricting, an
anticlassification logic when constraining affirmative action
programs, and a grasp of group-status production dynamics
when invalidating interracial marriage prohibitions.
One further reason for this heterogeneity is historical.
Specific cases and accounts of the courts’ role in American
history play anchoring roles in judicial reasoning.220 Definitional heterogeneity is unavoidable without abandoning canonical precedent and stories within the historical canon of
antidiscrimination. The repudiations of explicit racial segregation in the Jim Crow South, of the legitimate establishment of a
single national church, and of bars on interracial marriage—all
these are elements of our constitutional canon. In each of
these cases, different species of discriminatory intent are at
work—including taste-based discrimination, group-status production, and anticlassification. The Court’s jurisprudence is
necessarily oriented by the concerns raised by these cases. As
a result, it is likely to remain normatively plural.
Doctrine heterogeneity resulting from the plural ways in
which intent can figure in government decision-making and
historical precedent is not intrinsically problematic (although
the law’s current exclusion of unconscious bias lacks any adequate justification). But it would be better if the diversity of
discriminatory intents were frankly acknowledged. Familiar
debates about the permissibility of affirmative action, about
when differential regulatory treatment of religion implicates a
constitutional concept, and about the legality of seemingly
evenhanded prohibitions on interracial and same-sex marriage
and intercourse—all of these in part hinge on the question of
which conception of discriminatory intent to prioritize. This
question of taxonomy would be better confronted head on,
220
See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law,
111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 987 (1998) (noting the important role of “canonical narratives” in constitutional jurisprudence); Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon,
and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 244 (1998) (identifying cases that serve
each as a “locus classicus of a major doctrine of constitutional law” and that
thereby “continue to shape the law today”).
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rather than in the Court’s current crab-wise, obfuscatory
fashion.
At present, moreover, judges have discretion not only to
move between different conceptions of discriminatory intent.
They also contract or expand those conceptions across different cases. The boundaries between conceptions of unlawful
intent are ambiguous and contestable. This gives judges a discretion that is rarely recognized and that operates without
meaningful discipline—a discretion to which I now turn.
III
THE DISCOVERY OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
This Part analyzes a second aspect of the judicial treatment
of discriminatory intent. Focusing on decisions of the Supreme
Court, I explore the complex implications of the straightforward
fact that there exists a wide array of instruments for investigating allegations of discriminatory intent. My analysis here is
organized around a taxonomy of the evidentiary tools employed
to identify when discriminatory intent has played a role in government decision-making. These include the semantic context
of an official directive (such as a law or executive order); the
statements of officials; the context in which a policy was enacted, or its consequences once enacted; the results of depositions or interrogatories as elements of a pretrial discovery
process; and statistical evidence derived from econometric
analysis of the government’s action.
It is a striking and pervasive feature of the cases that the
permissibility and value of these materials is not framed as a
matter of evidence law generally or the Federal Rules of Evidence in particular. To the contrary, the evidentiary weighing
discussed in this Part exists at an angle to the latter body of
law. As a result, my analysis trains on the discriminatory intent case law narrowly, without trying to account for larger
evidence law questions.
The Supreme Court initially signaled its willingness to entertain a wide range of evidentiary strategies for identifying
improper intent. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., the Court recognized that the judicial task of discovering “whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available.”221
221

429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
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While Arlington Heights is now known largely for its “motivating factor” holding, and its concomitant rejection of the idea
that bias must be the sole or “dominant” factor,222 its approach
to evidence may well be as, or more, consequential. The Court
in that case canvassed a wide range of evidence, including
disparate impact; “historical background,” including deviations
from normal government procedure; “contemporary statements” by officials; and in “some extraordinary instances,” trial
testimony of decision-makers under oath.223 A similar approach is apparent in a roughly contemporaneous Establishment Clause case in which the Court was willing to take
judicial notice of facts—such as Kentucky’s “plainly religious”
motive for posting the Decalogue in all classrooms—evident
from social context but hard to prove by traditional means.224
But this capacious and catholic approach to the discovery
of discriminatory intent is honored more in the breach than in
the observance. In practice, even though Arlington Heights remains formally ‘good’ law, the Court responds to different kinds
of evidence in erratic and uneven ways. In respect to each
species of such evidence, it is possible to identify instances in
which the Court has been permissive. It is also possible to
identify other instances in which it categorically rejects the
same kind of evidence. Denying litigants license to introduce a
species of evidence, the Court typically appeals to the costs of
such permissions.225 But these cost estimates are persistently
based on fragile speculation, fail to account for alternative
ways of dealing with putative costs, and ignore the relevance of
other prohibitions on admissibility.226 Perhaps the most acute
example of such an interaction emerges in the criminal procedure domain, where the Court has separately, and without any
cross-reference, resisted the two most important instruments
for discovering illicit intent—the ordinary tools of discovery and
the empirical study of overall patterns of state behavior.227
In working through the five species of evidence generally
available to show discriminatory intent, I will emphasize two
222

See id. at 265–66.
Id. at 266–68.
224
See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam). Other Establishment Clause cases employed a similarly latitudinarian approach to discovery.
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 57 (1985) (relying on a range of testimonial and other sources to hold that Alabama’s moment-of-silence statute was
motivated by a desire to promote religion).
225
See infra subpart III.D.
226
See id.
227
See infra subparts III.D–E.
223
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overarching points. First, I draw attention to the contrary
treatment of the same kind of evidence in distinct cases. Second, I challenge the reasons given for intermittently excluding
or disregarding evidence of improper motive, suggesting that
the Court has either exaggerated the costs of allowing evidence
to be considered or minimized the benefits from doing so.
Working in tandem, these lines of arguments provide support
for my ultimate argument in favor of a return to the more
generous Arlington Heights approach in Part IV—an approach
that does not rig doctrine to favor some claims of discriminatory intent over others.
A. The Semantic Content of Laws and Regulations
The semantic content (or linguistic meaning)228 of government action that is reduced to writing as a law or regulation (or
as the transcript of an oral intercession by an official) seems an
obvious and uncontroversial place to start the search for discriminatory intent. The logic of anticlassification in particular
places great emphasis on semantic content, whereas the animus and group-status production theories treat it as less central. Perhaps as a consequence, there are relatively few formal
legal measures today that explicitly incorporate a suspect classification. Race is explicitly mentioned only now in remedial
measures employed in the secondary and tertiary education
contexts designed to respond to the continued absence of African-Americans and other minorities (and even there, rarely
so).229 Religion is mentioned when a state, moved by Establishment Clause concerns, moves to bar religious groups’ access to state funds or public forums.230 Neither kind of
measure fares well in court these days, reflecting the increasing vulnerability of explicit usages of formal categories.
228
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 95, 98 (2010) (“The semantic content of a legal text is simply the
linguistic meaning of the text.”).
229
See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016) (involving the
University of Texas); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 710–11 (2007) (involving the Seattle and Jefferson County school
districts); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003) (involving the University of
Michigan).
230
See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct.
2012, 2024 (2017) (involving Missouri’s Scrap Tire Program). For similar results
under a Free Speech rubric, see, for example, Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001), which discussed New York law on the use of school
facilities, and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995), which discussed the University of Virginia’s Guidelines for payments from its Student Activity Fund.
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In some instances, moreover, courts have evinced careful
sensitivity to textual clues that an impermissible classification
provides a structuring principle from the law. For instance, in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the
Court invalidated a Floridian municipal ordinance that was
“gerrymander[ed]” to prohibit Santeria ceremonies while permitting many other kinds of animal killing.231 But in addition
to looking at the irregular pattern of exceptions and inclusions,
the Court also flagged the specific vocabulary used in the measure—such as the “use [of] the words ‘sacrifice’ and ‘ritual’”—
as evidence that a discomfort with religion motivated the
law.232 Words matter not only for their narrow dictionary-defined content, but also for their unspoken, if readily available,
connotations.
A similar linguistic footprint is easily found in the March
2017 travel ban promulgated by President Trump.233 Like its
precursor, that order contains a peculiar and otherwise inexplicable reference to “honor killing.”234 That term is commonly
used solely to apply to Islamic contexts, notwithstanding the
tragic pervasiveness of intrafamilial violence against women in
many cultures, as a means to pejoratively taint Muslim men as
intrinsically violent.235 A case that does not mention a protected class by name but by a terminological proxy that is
easily discerned by the public—in effect, a rhetorical “dog whistle” that seeks to invoke a negative stereotype about a suspect
classification236—is by logic no different from an instance in
which the verbal specification of the targeted group is incrementally less occluded. It was a religious ban in form as well as
colloquial name.
231
See 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664,
696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
232
Id. at 533–34.
233
See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
234
Id. at 13,217; see also Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27,
2017) (“[T]he United States should not admit those who engage in acts of bigotry
or hatred (including ‘honor’ killings . . . .”).
235
See Lila Abu-Lughod, Seductions of the “Honor Crime”, 22 DIFFERENCES 17,
18 (2011) (“Honor crimes are explained as the behavior of a specific ethnic or
cultural community. The culture itself is taken to be the cause of the criminal
violence. Thus the category stigmatizes not a particular act but entire cultures or
ethnic communities.”); see also Inderpal Grewal, Outsourcing Patriarchy: Feminist
Encounters, Transnational Mediations and the Crime of ‘Honour Killings’, 15 INT’L
FEMINIST J. POL. 1, 2–3 (2013).
236
See generally IAN HANEY-LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 218–31 (2014)
(exploring the use of coded appeals to racial animus in American politics).
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But it would be a mistake to think that the infusion of a
formal legal text or instruction with an impermissible classification will always be grounds for quick invalidation. A surprisingly large number of common government practices turn on
the deployment of a suspect classification—and yet have remained beyond judicial purview. For example, even though
race is a common trait employed in police suspect descriptions
used by local, state, and federal law enforcement, federal
courts have not expended significant effort in considering their
constitutionality.237 Challenges to race-specific suspect selection are routinely turned aside by the federal courts.238 Similarly, the family law domain is characterized by “racial
permissiveness” with officials routinely employing race to make
decisions with large and immediate repercussions for particular individuals.239 No explanation has been tendered for these
exceptions. There is also no reason such gaps in judicial scrutiny cannot expand in the future.
Nevertheless, the semantic content of a law remains central in most other contexts. As a result, restrictions upon other
mechanisms for proving discriminatory intent tend to make the
semantic context of a law more important. Anticlassification
theories fit most comfortably on a foundation of semantic
meaning (and nothing else). Hence, isolating semantic meaning as the sole or preferred evidence of discriminatory intent is
a way of collapsing the definition of discriminatory intent, and
training solely upon anticlassification.240 In this way, a judge
can recalibrate the scope of constitutional prohibitions without
changing the formal content of substantive constitutional
doctrine.
237

See supra text accompanying note 163.
See, e.g., Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 387–90 (4th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (denying certiorari in a case exempting
race-based suspect selection from equal protection scrutiny); Brown v. City of
Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 333–34 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816 (2001)
(denying the same); see also Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing:
Evaluating Stop and Frisk As A Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397,
2446 (2017) (discussing judicial refusals to account for the constitutional consequences of race’s use in policing).
239
See Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 537, 540–41 (2014) (“Constitutional challenges to these race-based actions
have generally fared poorly, with courts typically (albeit not always) applying de
minimis constitutional scrutiny.”); accord R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire:
Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action,
107 YALE L.J. 875, 904–08 (1998).
240
Haney-López has argued that “Justices from Feeney to McCleskey were
prepared to uphold the challenged practices with or without the animus standard.
They never looked for governmental motives.” Haney-López, supra note 49, at
1858. As the main text makes clear, I think this is an exaggeration.

R

238

R
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B. Official Statements
It sometimes happens that an official responsible for a
state action makes a statement to another person that provides
prima facie evidence of an improper intent. It might seem that
such a “statement against interest”241 would be especially probative of the existence of one or another form of discriminatory
intent, especially where animus and group-status production
are suspected.242 Indeed, such statements often figure prominently in constitutional discrimination cases. For example, in
the 2017 North Carolina racial gerrymandering case discussed
in the Introduction, the Court identified statements on the
state-senate floor made by legislators responsible for mapmaking, that they felt they “must include a sufficient number of
African-Americans” in the challenged district.243 The Court
further relied on trial testimony from another state legislator to
the effect that mapmakers had expressed the same racial aim
to him.244
In a similar vein, when ascertaining the “purpose” of the
Defense of Marriage Act in Windsor, the Court looked to a
House Committee Report that pointed to “traditional (especially
Judeo-Christian) morality” as a basis for the measure.245 In
evaluating Alabama’s statute authorizing a daily moment of
silence in schools, the Court also looked to the statements of
the measure’s sponsors and took account of his confirmatory
statements before the district court.246 And in the recent challenge to juror discrimination under the Sixth Amendment, the
Court declined to treat the jury as a sealed black box after
evidence of improper motive had emerged.247 Finally, such
statements remain one of the few means of proving up the
241
Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (establishing hearsay exception for a statement
against interest, which “a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would
have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so
contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a
tendency to invalidate the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the
declarant to civil or criminal liability”).
242
Much depends, though, on what one means by “interest.” It may be that
an official appeals to invidious grounds because it is in his or her electoral interest, even though it works against the legality of the relevant position.
243
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1468 (2017).
244
See id. at 1476 (discussing trial testimony of Congressman Mel Watt).
245
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (citing and discussing H.R. REP. NO. 104–664 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905).
246
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 57–58 (1985).
247
See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (“[W]here a
juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes
or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the
no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the
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presence of bias in the criminal justice system more
generally.248
Nevertheless, there are ways to deflect the evidentiary force
of statements that are immediately probative of unconstitutional intent. The Court can carve out categories of constitutional challenges for resolution without regard to such
evidence, even when obvious and powerful proof of bias exists.
By crafting exceptions strategically, the Court can render irrelevant otherwise probative materials in circumstances where
other forms of evidence may be unlikely to emerge.249
An instructive example arises in the Establishment Clause
context of challenges to features of the physical landscape created by the state with an explicitly religious message. Ordinarily, both the religious and the sectarian content of such
measures are evident quite literally on the face of such monuments. Because their sponsors have no wish to shy away from
sectarian endorsements, moreover, statements against constitutional interest are not uncommon. A plurality of the Court in
a 2005 case concerning a stone inscription of the Decalogue on
the grounds of the Texas State Capital, however, suggested
that the purpose test employed in Establishment Clause jurisprudence was “not useful,” and instead, looked at “the nature
of the monument and . . . our Nation’s history.”250
But why? The plurality opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist
did not explain why the concept of purpose—which, as we have
seen, is employed across a wide range of other doctrinal and
institutional contexts—was inapposite in respect to monuments. Indeed, given that such monuments are typically created at a specific moment after a specific sequence of state
evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial
guarantee.”).
248
See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747–55 (2016) (holding that
the Georgia Supreme Court had made a “clearly erroneous” decision when it
declined to find that prosecution’s use of preemptory strikes in a capital case was
not animated by a discriminatory purpose in the face of lurid evidence to the
contrary); see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008). Outside the
context of Equal Protection and the Religion Clauses, the Court has said that a
“prosecutor’s disclosure of retaliatory thinking on his part, for example, would be
of great significance” when adjudicating a constitutional claim. Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 264 (2006).
249
Alternatively, courts can simply refuse to take notice of the use of, say,
racially charged language in the enactment of a criminal statute—as David Sklansky argues they have done in regard to the former sentencing provisions for crack
cocaine. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1283, 1303–04 (1995).
250
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality
opinion).
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actions and deliberations, they present straightforward cases
for purpose analysis. By contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
substitute analytic framework is notable largely because it is
inherently ambiguous (what constitutes the “nature” of a monument?) and open-ended (what parts of “our Nation’s history”
are relevant?).251 The Court hence creates an exception to the
purpose rule for cases in which probative evidence is likely to
be easily and readily available—and fails to offer persuasive (or,
indeed, any) reasons for its abrogation. Concern must arise
about the deployment of shifting evidentiary rules to achieve
substantive ends that the Court has not explicated or justified.
It is a sub rosa way of expunging all forms of intent-focused
analysis canvassed in Part II—including anticlassification
analysis—from the constitutional lexicon where a historical religious majority favors a challenged practice.
Another argument for resisting judicial consideration of
facially compromising statements focuses on the incentive effects of such a rule. In the juror bias case discussed above,
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion thus celebrated the jury’s
ability “to speak, debate, argue, and make decisions the way
ordinary people do in their daily lives.”252 In the challenge to
the travel ban case, the government has argued in similar
terms that campaign statements should not be admissible evidence of impermissible bias on the part of an elected official
lest democratic debate be chilled.253 But such incentive-based
arguments are at best speculative and at worst specious.
Consider first the jury case. Justice Alito’s key theoretical
premise is that juries should work as miniature versions of the
democratic polity. This is a claim that is flawed as a matter of
both history and practice.254 The “aim of a jury is explicitly
epistemic,” not representational.255 Jury deliberations are not
251
Cf. B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism
and Change in Meaning over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705, 731 (2010) (concluding that
“courts have not analyzed the constitutionality of brief official religious references,
often referred to as ceremonial deism, in a thorough or nuanced way”).
252
Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 874 (Alito, J., dissenting).
253
See Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order of the Executive Order at 28–32, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.
2017) (No. 17-00361) (“Permitting campaign statements to contradict official pronouncements of the government’s objectives would inevitably ‘chill political debate during campaigns.’”).
254
See Melissa Schwartzberg, Democracy, Judgment, and Juries, in MAJORITY
DECISIONS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 196, 196–97 (Stéphanie Novak & Jon Elster
eds., 2014) (noting that jury selection has not, as a historic matter, been along
democratic grounds).
255
Id. at 196–97.
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“ordinary” speech familiar from “daily lives.” Rather, they arise
in a legally structured environment in which lay judgments are
exhorted on specific questions of law and fact.256 The existence
of a pervasive bias against a certain group in “ordinary” society
does not legitimate the recapitulation of that bias in jury deliberations. To the contrary, norms against the expression of irrelevant and distortionary tropes that characterize demotic
speech promote the jury’s specialized epistemic and adjudicative functions.257
Similarly, a powerful critique could be mounted against the
Government’s argument in the travel ban case respecting the
admission of campaign speech. To begin with, candidates
seeking to play on discriminatory sentiments among the public
are unlikely to be chilled by the prospect of litigation (which
might simply allow them to amplify their rhetoric and include
federal judges among their targets). Where pre-election rhetoric tracks post-election action, moreover, there are good Bayesian grounds for concluding that the earlier rhetoric was not
mere puffery. Finally, it is passing odd to reject evidence on the
ground that candidates should not be understood to mean
what they say prior to an election: It might instead be more
compatible with the democratic commitments of the Constitution to make precisely the opposite assumption as a way of
taking seriously the electoral structures created in Articles I
and II. Those who urge the disregard of campaign statements
implicitly treat the democratic process as little more than a
cheap vaudeville—bright lights, thickly caked makeup, and
naught of enduring substance.
More generally, it is hard to conceive of reasons to ignore
statements—already made and available as proof—when their
content provides prima facie evidence of improper intent. The
exceptions to this rule, whether in the doctrine or offered in
current cases, are unpersuasive and should be abandoned.
256
Note the tension between Justice Alito’s argument and arguments to exclude campaign statements in the travel ban case. Jurors’ statements do not
count even if they arise within patterned legal structures; a candidate’s statements do not count because they do not arise within patterned legal structures.
257
Justice Alito’s argument might alternatively be understood as follows: although naked expressions of bias (as occurred in Peña-Rodriguez) are never useful or proper, there is a grey area in which jurors might be chilled from discussing
facts pertinent to a verdict. It is not at all obvious, however, that this domain
exists, and it requires further speculation to conclude that the remote and uncertain prospect of judicial inquiry would have any effect at all on such juror behavior. Moreover, the benefits of discouraging invidious speech that has neither
epistemic value nor normative content likely outweigh the fragile benefits of avoiding an evanescent chilling effect.
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C. Circumstantial Evidence: History and Consequences
Discriminatory intent is often inferable from circumstantial evidence that takes a variety of forms. The Court in Arlington Heights, for example, identified the “specific sequence of
events” preceding the challenged decision, “[d]epartures from
the normal procedural sequence,” and a more general category
of “legislative or administrative history.”258 A similar procedure was said to govern Establishment Clause challenges,
which are evaluated within the “history of the government’s
actions.”259
Arlington Heights’ list is unfinished. A somewhat trivial
missing item is the physical setting of a measure challenged on
Establishment Clause grounds.260 But more substantial and
generalizable omissions exist. For instance, a mismatch between expected consequences and legitimate policy justifications can undermine the assumption that the latter motivated
a law. In Romer v. Evans, for example, the Court concluded
that Colorado’s Amendment 2, which prohibited most legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination, “raise[d] the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected.”261 The outcome of Romer
did not depend on a direct evaluation of the voting public’s
intent. Instead, it was justified by the Court’s observation that
Amendment 2 was “so discontinuous with the reasons offered
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class it affects.”262 Romer then rested on an
inference from the means-ends rationality of a single policy
measure—an index of bias typically unavailable when the ob258
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267–68
(1977). This is not to say that any one of these factors is necessary. Indeed, the
Court has resisted efforts to calcify the Arlington Heights factors in given contexts.
See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 799 (2017)
(“[A] conflict or inconsistency between the enacted plan and traditional redistricting criteria is not a threshold requirement or a mandatory precondition in order
for a challenger to establish a claim of racial gerrymandering . . . .”). Even in the
immediate wake of the Arlington Heights decision, moreover, the Court at times
“disregard[ed] contextual evidence in unprincipled ways.” Haney-López, supra
note 49, at 1843 (discussing City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981)).
259
McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005); see Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (looking to the “text and history” of a policy
challenged on Establishment Clause grounds).
260
In a perhaps unintentionally comic line, the Court once declared with
Solomonic seriousness that “the crèche stands alone” as a way of distinguishing
earlier precedent. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598 (1989).
261
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
262
Id. at 632.
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ject of the popular franchise is a person or a political party that
represents a cluster of policies and values.
Context and consequences are likely to be of greatest salience when animus, statistical discrimination, or group-status
production are at issue. They will generally matter less in anticlassification challenges. The doctrinal instruments for hiding context from judicial consideration therefore push toward
an anticlassification analysis, while relegating other theories of
discriminatory intent to the back-burner.
Perhaps the most important doctrinal barrier to serious
consideration of context is the idea of deference to a putatively
expert official, a deference that obviates the need to consider
contextual clues that impermissible intent was at stake.
Judges vary, however, in their willingness to exercise such deference across different contexts, often in unprincipled ways.
The willingness to look beyond the reasons supplied for an
official decision seemingly fluctuates in accord with judges’ priors about a given class of officials.
The problem is not the preserve of one or the other ideological wing of the bench. On the one hand, liberal judges have
evinced deference to university administrators’ use of classifications and rules that raise concerns about the role of both
race and religion. Endorsing a state university’s imposition of a
nondiscrimination requirement on all student groups that
sought funding from the public fisc, for instance, a liberal majority of the Supreme Court underscored its “appropriate regard for school administrators’ judgment” in determining how
best to promote educational goals.263 In dissent, Justice Alito
highlighted facts tending to suggest that administrators had
been hostile to the plaintiff student groups based on their religious nature.264 By contrast, Justice Alito (as well as Justice
Thomas), viewed the Trump travel ban through a Vaselinesmeared lens of deference akin to the one they had criticized
only a few years before.265 More generally, conservative justices seem more comfortable embracing those who exercise
263

Christian Legal Soc. Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 687 (2010).
See id. at 717–18 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing failures of a university
administrator to respond to requests for group registrations). For a parallel complaint about excessive deference to university administrators’ judgments about
race in the affirmative action context, see Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198,
2215 (2016) (Alito. J., dissenting).
265
See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089–90
(2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting “the
Government has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits”).
264
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force—police or national security officials—as experts warranting deference.
The general question of deference to officials on the basis of
expertise and political accountability is a large one.266 But the
specific question raised by these cases is quite narrow—and
also rather easy to answer. When a judge must answer the
factual question whether an agency official has acted on the
basis of an unconstitutional motive, standard justifications for
deference based on expertise and political accountability are
not relevant. The policy expertise of, say, university administrators in the University of California system or career staffers
to the National Security Council has no bearing on the question
whether they acted with a discriminatory intent. There is no
logical relation between expertise and a fair disposition toward
vulnerable social groups. Nor does the logic of democratic accountability supply any reason to defer to an official’s factual
claim that they acted on the basis of proper motives rather
than unlawful bias.267
At best, expertise may be relevant if a defendant official
points to evidence that they in fact relied on their bespoke
knowledge and skills in riposte to a bias allegation. But when
evaluating the factual question whether a plaintiff’s allegation,
or this response, is a more persuasive account of historical
events, there is no reason to favor a priori one side in that
dispute.
More generally, there is a long-standing consensus among
scholars that even expert administrative agencies have no special competence as to the specification of constitutional
rules.268 It follows from this position a fortiori that officials
266
For a crisp statement of this familiar point, and a collection of sources, see
Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1765 (2012).
267
The standard—and most powerful—explanation for counter-majoritarian
protection of minorities defined on racial or religious grounds is that the democratic process does not work well to protect their interests. See JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 152 (1980) (expressing concern for minorities “barred
from the pluralist’s bazaar”); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in
the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1296 (1982) (describing groups that
need constitutional protection because they are “perpetual losers” in the political
arena).
268
See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77
TEX. L. REV. 113, 194 (1998) (“[C]ourts never defer to agencies in reading the
Constitution.”); Michael Skocpol, The Emerging Constitutional Law of Prison Gerrymandering, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1473, 1517 (2017) (arguing that courts “should not
defer to executive agencies when the underlying question is one of constitutional
interpretation”); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 146
(2010) (“De novo review is appropriate when agencies are interpreting laws that
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should obtain no particular deference when it comes to factual
findings that are necessary predicates to the application of a
constitutional antidiscrimination rule.269 To grant such deference would create a special dispensation to violate constitutional rules when their application turned on questions of
disputable fact.270
Once again, the reasons for categorically excluding or ignoring the evidence of discriminatory intent in the form of context and consequences—wholly prior to litigation—are at best
fragile. Once again, it seems there is little reason to carve out
distinct exceptions to how plaintiffs can go about proving an
unlawfully discriminatory intent, especially when doing so disadvantages plaintiffs suffering under the various forms of discriminatory intent to varying extents.
D. The Mechanisms of Civil Discovery
Of course, in many cases, no smoking-gun statement by an
official will be available.271 And, often, the circumstances and
consequences of policymaking will be empirically murky, their
interpretation amenable to sharply conflicting takes. The consequences of statistical discrimination in particular will be
often observationally equivalent to reliance on a permissible
trait. No clear inference of improper motive may be discerned
from semantic content, context, or immediate consequences.
As a result, mundane mechanisms of civil discovery such as
interrogatories, depositions, and document production may be
especially important in substantiating the presence of discriminatory intent that takes the form of animus, group-status production, or statistical discrimination.272
they do not have a special responsibility to administer, like the Constitution, the
APA, or Title VII.”).
269
In David Faigman’s influential typology, there are “facts peculiar to the
dispute and which must be examined under the pertinent constitutional rule.”
David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 553 (1991).
270
A separate question is presented when an agency argues that a law is
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest. But that question of
fact does not arise until after a discriminatory intent has been identified.
271
See Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 112 (2012)
(“Proof of intent is rarely direct. It is usually circumstantial, even multidetermined.”).
272
See Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Because employers rarely leave a paper trail—or ‘smoking gun’—[of] discriminatory
intent . . . plaintiffs often must build their cases from pieces of circumstantial
evidence which cumulatively undercut the [defendant’s] credibility . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
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From the beginning of intent-focused antidiscrimination
jurisprudence, however, federal courts have been
preternaturally cautious about civil discovery against the government. The Arlington Heights Court, for example, described
the use of trial testimony (although not discovery) as “extraordinary.”273 Since then, the Supreme Court and lower
courts have evinced a rising hostility to statutory discrimination cases more generally.274 Perhaps with those cases in
mind, the Justices have implemented a series of procedural
changes, including to the well-pleaded complaint rule and the
summary judgment regime.275 These have had “a disparate
impact on employment discrimination and civil rights cases”
against both private and state actors, insofar as the latter tend
to be more dependent on pretrial discovery than other species
of cases.276
Nevertheless, civil discovery and trial testimony remain important ways to find evidence of discriminatory intent. For
example, in a legal challenge to Alabama’s 2012 redistricting of
its House and Senate seats, the Court looked to evidence from
a sequence of depositions “to show that the legislature had
deliberately moved black voters into . . . majority-minority districts.”277 The dissent did not object to the legality of such
depositions. It instead argued that more effective use of “discovery and trial” would be necessary to demonstrate that specific districts had been improperly drawn.278
By contrast, discovery is generally not available when the
Court deems it likely to be costly or an infringement on the
prerogatives of the executive branch. This perception has been
most acute when the state acts coercively against specific individuals—a context in which animus and statistical discrimination are more likely to be present than group-status production
or anticlassification concerns. In a series of cases cross-cut273
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268
(1977).
274
See Gertner, supra note 271, at 109 (reporting, based on author’s experience as a federal judge, that “[f]ederal courts . . . were hostile to discrimination
cases”).
275
See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination
Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 523–24 (2010).
276
Id. at 524–25.
277
Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1266 (2015).
For other discussions of the use of evidence yielded by civil discovery in racial
gerrymander cases, see Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1475 (2017) and League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 452 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
278
Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1277 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ting the criminal law and immigration law fields—i.e., the modal forms of individuated coercive state action today—the
Court has imposed functionally insurmountable barriers to
discovery. For example, in the context of racially selective prosecution claims, the Court in United States v. Armstrong prohibited discovery unless a defendant can produce “some evidence
that similarly situated defendants of other races could have
been prosecuted, but were not.”279 Of course, since such defendants were not prosecuted in federal court (and were unlikely to have been charged in state court), it will rarely be the
case that documentary evidence of their existence will be available.280 In the immigration-removal context, the Court has
simply ruled out selective enforcement claims about “outrageous” discrimination.281 In the visa-issuance context (where
the relevant state actor is typically a consular official located
extraterritorially), it has deferred to the “facially legitimate and
bona fide” decisions of consular officials.282
These deference regimes, which regulate both access to
pretrial discovery and to trial, are justified first, in terms of the
deadweight costs of selective prosecution claims283 and second, in terms of a constitutional worry about judicial interference with “a core executive constitutional function.”284 But
both of those justifications for constrained discovery are far
weaker than first appearances might suggest.
Of course, constitutional antidiscrimination rules should
constrain prosecutorial discretion.285 The only question here
is whether discovery imposes excessive costs. But it is not at all
clear that permitting more extensive discovery would have such
279
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996). In the context of
discriminatory use of preemptory strikes, a defendant can invoke a hearing but
not discovery. See Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed
Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 346–47 (2007).
280
See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the
Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 618–19 (1998).
281
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 491
(1999).
282
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972); accord Kerry v. Din, 135
S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
283
See AADC, 525 U.S. at 490; Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; see also Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (“Examining the basis of a prosecution
delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting
the prosecutor’s motives and decision making to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement
policy.”).
284
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
285
See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979). The immigration context presents distinct questions; for instance, there is a threshold question whether a specific individual benefits from constitutional protections.
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costs. Although not an exact parallel, states’ experiences with
so-called “open file” policies are instructive. Several states
have adopted various iterations of an open-file policy, by which
defendants have broad access to materials in a prosecutor’s
files.286 These policies, however, have not led to dramatic
changes in clearance rates or case processing, perhaps because public defenders’ resources tend to be sufficiently constrained so as to preclude their aggressive exploitation of openfile policies.287 That is, allowing discovery by default does not
impose deadweight costs that reduce the rate of prosecutions.
State-level experience with open-file policies, therefore, undermine the Court’s concern with the disruptive effect of increasing discovery of prosecutorial motivations. Compounding the
minimal effect of greater discovery, it seems quite likely that
judges would be reluctant to impose “extreme” sanctions such
as the dismissal of charges even when evidence of bias did
surface.288 Hence, it is far from clear that more discovery
would change the outcome of specific cases (even if it changes
the mix of cases filed). Given that concerns about prosecutorial
discretion are often taken as the paradigmatic case justifying
limited evidentiary discovery, it is reasonable to worry that
more peripheral cases will involve even weaker governmental
anti-disclosure justifications.
Moreover, it is striking that the Court has cracked open, if
only slightly, the jury room to allow inquiry into discriminatory
intent, while keeping prosecutorial discretion shrouded from
view. Juries have long been a vanishingly small part of the
criminal justice system.289 In contrast, prosecutors exercise
vast authority as a result of their charging and plea bargaining
authority on criminal justice matters.290 Prosecutorial deci286
See Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L.
REV. 771, 789 (2017) (noting variation in forms of open-file discovery).
287
See id. at 796 (finding based on analysis of several states’ experience that
“open-file may not reduce the trial rate or speed up pleas”).
288
Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 254
(2017). Indeed, it is far from clear that courts can ever serve as robust supervisors
of prosecutorial behavior. Their limited institutional capacity means such oversight will always be seriously incomplete. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial
Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 1016
(2009) (“Conventional external regulation has failed to guide prosecutors. It cannot work well because outsiders lack the information, capacity, and day-to-day
oversight to structure patterns of decisions.”). Structural limitations of this sort
further diminish defendants’ incentives to use extensive discovery beyond what
Armstrong and Wayte allow.
289
See Bibas, supra note 288, at 961.
290
See id. at 971 (describing the prosecutor’s “dominant” role). This has long
been the case. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM.
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sions are also “important” sources of racial disparities, especially decisions about mandatory minimums.291 To the extent
that public confidence in the criminal justice system is a function of the actual influence of race-based decision making, current doctrine thus seems to have its priorities backward.
Allowing greater discovery of prosecutors’ intent may deter
what appears to be a significant effect of unconstitutional bias.
It would also eliminate any marginal incentive for a prosecutor
to use a plea bargain rather than a trial given the knowledge
that jurors’ racial biases may be more readily exposed than
prosecutors’.
E. Statistical Evidence
The final kind of evidence useful for demonstrating unconstitutional discrimination is the output of econometric models
that estimate either the causal effect of a suspect classification
in government action or, alternatively, identify correlations between the distribution of that classification and the state’s imposition of costs on the public. Evidence of this sort is also
useful to root out the use of impermissible criteria as proxies
for other goals. By contrast, it is not needed in anticlassification challenges.
Judicial attitudes to statistical evidence of race discrimination have been inconsistent. On the one hand, judges embrace
such evidence in the context of gerrymandering cases, where it
helps tease out the correlations between districting and race,
partisanship, and other relevant factors with precision.292 On
the other hand, the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp rejected the
use of system-wide empirical evidence of racial disparities to
demonstrate discriminatory intent on the part of a specific
jury.293 While McCleskey focused on the inference of intent
from systemic characteristics—i.e., the role of race in the Georgia capital punishment system as a whole—to specific criminal
proceedings, lower courts have extended its holding to the
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940) (“The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty,
and reputation than any other person in America.”).
291
See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial
Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE
L.J. 2, 10 (2013). The same authors analyze the sources for racial disparities
across the criminal justice process and identify prosecutors’ charging decisions as
key to the production of those disparities. See Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr,
Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1321–22
(2014).
292
See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1477–78 (2017) (describing the
introduction of expert econometric analysis).
293
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–93 (1987).
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quite different context of statistical evidence about the role of
race in a single decision-maker’s actions over time (e.g., a single district attorney over a number of years).294 By contrast,
challenges to policing policies, such as stop and frisk, have at
times turned in part on statistical evidence that the distribution of police actions cannot be explained by the historical distribution of crimes, but are instead closely correlated to racial
demographics.295
Judicial skepticism of econometric evidence of impermissible motives is unwarranted and unwise. To begin with, the
McCleskey Court criticized the study of the Georgia capital
punishment system presented in that case because it did not
“prove that race enters into any capital sentencing decisions,”
but only “show[s] . . . a likelihood” of this impermissible result.296 This is true, but also irrelevant. Most sophisticated
econometric analysis of a complex phenomenon characterized
by multiple potential causal predicates will entail several model
specifications, each of which assumes a different set of structural relationships between tested variables. The coefficients
derived from such models—say, of race effects—are not an unmediated measure of causal or correlational effects. They require careful interpretation.297 What the McCleskey Court took
to be a criticism is thus a persistent quality of econometric
evidence: It always and only “show[s] . . . a likelihood” of
bias.298 It is not “proof” in the same form as an inculpatory oral
statement. But this is all the more reason not to dismiss it
categorically. It is precisely because statistical evidence is almost never determinative on its own, but rather grist to a process of Bayesian inference that accounts for other factors, that
its admission is not as disruptive and destabilizing as the Mc294
See John H. Blume et. al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in
Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1794–95 (1998).
295
See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 435–36 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); see also Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the
New York City Police Department’s “Stop and Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims
of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 817–18 (2007) (presenting the
econometric analysis relevant to Floyd in greater detail).
296
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308.
297
See, e.g., James B. Grace & Kenneth A. Bollen, Interpreting the Results
from Multiple Regression and Structural Equation Models, 86 BULL. ECOLOGICAL
SOC. AM. 283, 285–86 (2005) (describing the error of drawing inferences from
unstandardized coefficients and exploring the inferences available based on standardized coefficients).
298
As has long been known to legal scholars. Cf. Julia Lamber et al., The
Relevance of Statistics to Prove Discrimination: A Typology, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 553,
582 (1983).
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Clesky Court feared (or perhaps, as catalytic as its proponents
might hope).
A more promising approach to statistical evidence in the
criminal justice context is reflected in a 1977 case in which the
Court found proof of substantial deviations between a racial
group’s representation on juries and its presence in the population at large. This evidence, in conjunction with a jury selection system susceptible to abuse, was identified as a prima
facie equal protection violation.299 That is, econometric results
provided a basis for inference—not proof per se—much like
most other sorts of evidence. In that spirit, the judge tasked
with investigating discriminatory intent should embrace statistical findings for their modest, but important, role of evidentiary support.300 Their general exclusion in the criminal justice
context after McClesky is especially unfortunate since that context is one in which animus and statistical discrimination are
often best flushed out using econometric tools.
F. The State of (Evidentiary) Play
Scholars have to date paid little attention to the evolving
strategies of proof available to litigants alleging discriminatory
intent under the Constitution. But this has been a domain of
dramatic and consequential change. This Part has demonstrated that granular shifts in these evidentiary doctrines can
and do drive change over the forms and loci of justiciable discrimination, even as the Court makes no formal change to the
substantive law of Equal Protection and the Religion Clauses.
The contrast with older doctrine is striking: When it enthroned intent as the axiomatic term in the Constitution’s protection of vulnerable social minorities, the Court embraced a
broad and varied range of evidentiary tools. This appropriately
flexible approach has largely vanished in favor of a more erratic
and haphazard methodology.
The Court has offered a range of justifications for refusing
to attend to officials’ public statements, declining to account
for statistical evidence, and ignoring context and history. But
these justifications have consistently been flawed. The case for
299

See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 n.13, 496–97 n.17 (1977).
By contrast, courts increasingly allow, and even demand, econometric evidence when agencies act in the form of cost-benefit analysis. See Michigan v.
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (requiring agency quantification of costs, as
well as benefits); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009)
(holding that the EPA was permitted to use cost-benefit analysis in the face of an
ambiguous statute).
300
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categorical exclusions from the evidentiary toolkit for proving
discriminatory intent, therefore, is weak even if one limits the
analysis to the considerations proffered by the Justices
themselves.
IV
RECONSTRUCTING THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
This Part develops two external critiques of current arrangements for discovering discriminatory intent based on its
distributional and epistemic effects. It then articulates the basic elements of a more evenhanded doctrinal framework that
accounts for the full range of conceptions of discriminatory
intent. As importantly, the approach proposed here does not
tilt the playing field away from any subset of meritorious discrimination claims.
My aim in this Part, to be clear, is not to recapitulate the
hoary contest between anticlassificatory and alternate concepts of discriminatory intent. Rather, it is to demonstrate that
a manageable, principled, and transparent doctrinal structure
for evaluating both these and other kinds of discrimination
claims is within reach. It could be used instead of current
arrangements for discovering discriminatory intent—even as
disagreement persists about which conception of discriminatory intent to prioritize.
A. The Substantive Effects of Evolving Rules for
Discovering Bias
A threshold consequence of changes to the evidentiary approaches to discriminatory intent has been to make certain
conceptions of intent increasingly immune from constitutional
scrutiny. By opening, closing, or narrowing different evidentiary pathways by which a party asserting a constitutional right
might be able to demonstrate an improper motive, the judiciary
nudges the burden of constitutional constraint from one institution to another.
Consider an example of the way in which the doctrine
pushes judicial scrutiny between different loci of potential discrimination: Large institutions such as schools and universities necessarily operate through the internal promulgation of
written regulations and guidance to discrete officials. Their
reliance on such guidance—say, when determining admissions
or regulating student groups—means they necessarily depend
on written commands between hierarchically-situated officials.
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The semantic context of such commands is almost always going to be available as evidence in discriminatory intent cases
and now will almost always be amenable to discovery.
By contrast, in the criminal justice context, smaller prosecution offices may not need to formalize orders in writing. And
if impermissible criteria are invoked in internal documents, it
is unlikely that these will be flushed out through litigation after
Armstrong. Moreover, judicial skepticism about statistical evidence bars the indirect demonstration of impermissible considerations in prosecutorial decisions. Hence, although
McCleskey and Armstrong do not cite each other, they have an
important interaction insofar as they simultaneously block the
two most important pathways to proving up impermissible intent in the criminal justice context.
This means that it is harder (all else being equal) to discriminate in the school than in the prison or the prosecutor’s
office. But why should this be so? It is difficult to see how this
differential is justified from a normative perspective, especially
given what is known about the extent of racial bias in the
criminal justice system.301
More broadly, the doctrine’s prioritization of evidence of
semantic content over circumstantial, statistical, or testimonial evidence acts as a subsidy for anticlassification claims in
relation to claims based on alternate conceptions of discriminatory intent.302 One exception is that anticlassification logic
loses its force in the criminal law context. This is because the
Court has been unwilling to rule on the constitutionality of
race-based investigative decisions even when they shade into
the use of race as a general proxy for criminal suspicion.303 On
the other side of the ledger, most other claims of discriminatory
intent are set up to fail given the lack of relevant evidentiary
tools. Again, there is an exception: Where a potentially discriminatory animus or statistical discrimination is the work of
an institutional body, and is challenged through post hoc civil
litigation—think of the affirmative action or the racial gerrymandering cases—the Court has been willing to entertain
301

See sources cited supra note 291.
Reva Siegel identifies Washington v. Davis as the origin of this phenomenon. See Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 48, at 9, 15–23. In contrast, I have
argued that it comes later and is a function of the more granular evidence rules
documented in Part III.
303
See supra text accompanying note 238 (citing cases); Huq, supra note 238,
at 2452–56 (criticizing application of Equal Protection rules in the criminal
context).

R
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wide-ranging civil discovery to explore how and when impermissible classifications have come into play.304
Three more general points emerge from this bird’s-eye
view. First, the net result of these doctrinal trends is that
legislative bodies are more likely to see their work closely scrutinized for bias than executive branch actors. Second, where
discretionary policy decisions are not executed through written
instructions, but instead via case-by-case determinations (as is
the case with prosecutors often and police almost always), it
will be harder to prove a discriminatory intent. Third, it is
easier to challenge a non-coercive than a coercive policy (i.e.,
one in the criminal, national security, or immigration contexts),
even though the latter entail more immediate and harmful invasions of bodily integrity and liberty.
All this means that as the context of a discriminatory intent challenge moves from legislative handling of a regulatory
issue to the exercise of dispersed executive discretion over state
coercion, antidiscrimination norms lose their deterrent force.
In part, this means not only that courts are more likely to
enforce anticlassification norms than other conceptions of discriminatory intent. It also means that the animus and statistical discrimination conceptions are unevenly and somewhat
erratically implemented. Hence, what Ian Haney-López condemns as binary “intentional blindness” to bias against minorities grounded on the deliberate refusal to look inside the
“minds of government officials,” may be understood also as the
results of uneven calibration of different evidentiary
implements.305
This doctrinal arrangement has two troubling implications.
First, it will lead judges to recognize some forms of intent, but
not others, as a predicate to their remediation. It hence creates
winners and losers among those subject to unconstitutional
discrimination. The winners will tend to be social majorities.
For the modal form of race-conscious decision-making that is
easiest to challenge under this evidentiary dispensation is the
codified affirmative action program that promotes the interests
of minorities. Establishments that reflect an explicit preference for religious majorities, moreover, are often insulated from
review by a doctrinal lens that focuses on tradition rather than
semantic content.306
304
305
306

See sources cited supra note 298.
Haney-López, supra note 49, at 1853–54.
See supra text accompanying note 245.
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In contrast, the species of discrimination that matter most
to racial and religious minorities—in particular, the improper
use of discretion by police, prosecutors, and immigration officials—receive the most circumscribed judicial attention as a
result of doctrines that preclude the acquisition or consideration of the most probative forms of evidence. It is true that
racial gerrymanders receive more capacious attention and “holistic analysis,”307 but challenges to the use of race in redistricting have an ambiguous distributive effect. When deployed
like challenges to affirmative action, they are a means to amplify as well as limit minority voting power. As a result, the
evidentiary framework for taking stock of constitutional discriminatory intent tilts against the minority groups and in favor
of racial and religious majorities. Rather than being countermajoritarian, the constitutional law of antidiscrimination
tracks the interest of socially dominant groups with impressive
precision. It has become an instrument of redistribution from
marginalized minority groups to socially powerful majority
groups—a symptom, rather than a cure, of the pathologies of
hierarchical exclusion that are regrettably common in American history.
Second, the effect of this uneven distribution of judicial
resources does not end with the allocation or denial of remedies. Courts are not the only means of remedying social
wrongs, but they play a central role in the American context. In
particular, the Supreme Court has come to play a dominant
role in national life. It enjoys a deep reservoir of sociological
legitimacy among the American public.308 The Court’s rulings
on constitutional matters—and by implication, the Court’s implicit judgments about what matters and what does not matter
for constitutional compliance—therefore likely shape, at least
to some extent, the public’s understanding of the normatively
freighted question of whether the Constitution is being followed
or violated.309
307

Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 800 (2017).
See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public
Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 637 (1992) (documenting
Court’s deep reservoir of public legitimacy); Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon I.
Smithey, Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 57 J. POL. 1114,
1124–25 (1997) (“Public support for the Supreme Court tends to be both high and
stable—aggregate traits that seemingly reveal an institution largely insulated
from short-term shifts in public preferences.”).
309
For evidence of this effect in Establishment Clause cases, see Valerie J.
Hoekstra & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Shepherding of Local Public Opinion: The Supreme
Court and Lamb’s Chapel, 58 J. POL. 1079, 1079, 1096–97 (1996), and Michael A.
Unger, After the Supreme Word: The Effect of McCreary County v. ACLU (2005)
308
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By selectively shining its spotlight on the existence of discrimination in some domains and not others, the Court helps
define what might be called our common constitutional landscape. This is our shared sense of the landscape of constitutional rights and wrongs that characterize the polity at a given
moment. Uneven allocation of judicial search expenditures
makes some kinds of wrongs more salient, and hence more
plausible problems for political redress, than others, even if
their salience is not supportable on more empirically robust
grounds. What follows has been usefully labeled “hermeneutical injustice” by the philosopher Miranda Fricker. This is a
phenomenon in which “some significant area of one’s social
experience [is] obscured from collective understanding owing to
persistent and wide-ranging hermeneutical marginalization.”310 The doctrine for discovering discriminatory intent, on
this view, does not merely fail to redress extant wrongs. It also
perpetrates an independent moral harm by reinforcing the
nonrecognition of the wide range of discriminatory harms that
fall predictably on racial and religious minorities.311 In so doing, it may well be that our constitutional doctrine of antidiscrimination is likely to “induce indifference, fatalism, and
passive injustice.”312 Paradoxically, constitutional equality
doctrine itself may sustain and perpetuate the very structural
inequalities it purports to heal.
One final implication of an emphasis upon the hermeneutical quality of the Court’s interventions in social life is that the
mechanisms whereby different interest groups can mobilize in
federal court have meaningful distributive consequences. By
assigning to different factions different shares of the scarce
resource of litigation as a means of focusing public attention,
and Van Orden v. Perry (2005) on Support for Public Displays of the Ten Commandments, 36 AM. POL. RES. 750, 766–77 (2008). For like evidence on gay rights, see
James W. Stoutenborough, Donald P. Haider-Markel & Mahalley D. Allen, Reassessing the Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil Rights
Cases, 59 POL. RES. Q. 419, 430 (2006), which explains that “Supreme Court
decisions can have a significant impact on public opinion in the area of gay civil
rights.” For skepticism of this effect, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 424
(2004), which focuses on the school desegregation cases.
310
MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER & THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 154
(2007) (emphasis omitted). A paradigmatic example is the failure to recognize
sexual harassment until the 1970s. See id. at 149–50.
311
Across American history, for example, racism has been mutative, taking
various forms and flowing variously through both state-sanctioned and social
sinews. It was “not fully codified into laws” until the twentieth century. GEORGE
M. FREDERICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 100 (rev. ed. 2015).
312
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 126 (1990).
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the law of Article III standing and the various devices for the
collective resolution of legal questions in federal court ought to
be understood as allocative instruments. They determine who
can speak, and have become, for better or worse, the gatekeepers of the quintessential American platform for rendering legible the moral wrongs of society.313
B. Reconstructing the Judicial Toolbox in Discriminatory
Intent Cases
But there is no reason to stick with the current asymmetries in doctrinal allocations. It is possible to imagine an alternative doctrinal regime that furnishes a more level playing field
than current arrangements. The key to this improvement is
implicit in Part III’s argument. I spell it out here in detail.
To begin with, it requires principled and consistent judicial
explanations for the choice among possible conceptions of discrimination. There are necessarily multiple ways in which race
can figure in government decision-making. The Court should
acknowledge this diversity and its implications more frankly.
Most importantly, diverse forms of impermissible intent will be
amenable to different kinds of evidentiary approaches. Current
law, with its lacunae and limitations on evidence acquisition,
implicitly favors some conceptions of unconstitutional intent
over others. A better approach would involve a frank recognition on judges’ part of the compelling need for a deep and
diverse evidentiary toolkit in dealing with unconstitutional discrimination. It would also entail the abolition of the existing
bespoke exceptions, based on deference, hostility to numbers,
or a blinkered conception of the relevant transactional frame.
All relevant, otherwise-admissible evidence should always be
acquired and considered in searching for discriminatory intent.
Categorical exclusions and caveats should be uniformly abandoned—including judicial resistance to evidence of unconscious bias and the bench’s culpable failure to account for
pervasive, structural discrimination.
This approach is warranted on more pragmatic grounds
too. A constitutional rule concerning official intent must cover
a wide range of institutional and policy contexts. In this regard, it is dissimilar from elements of the Bill of Rights that
speak to the discrete and relatively isolated phenomenon such
313
My aim here has not been to explain how these asymmetries arose, but it is
perhaps worth noting that majoritarian capture of the instruments of progressive
redistribution to redress historical injustices is nothing particularly new in American history.
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as the criminal trial.314 An intent-based regime under either
the Equal Protection Clause or the Religion Clause must be
flexible enough to apply to collective bodies of legislators, citizens engaged in lawmaking through initiatives or referenda,
apex officials (such as governors and presidents) charged with
the formulation of general policy, and also line-level officials
(such as police officers and prosecutors) responsible for the
front-line interactions between the state and members of the
polity. Moreover, the Constitution’s protection of vulnerable
minorities extends across different policy domains. Most importantly, it applies to both coercive and noncoercive policy
choices.
This institutional and policy variety means that there will
inevitably be heterogeneity of institutional form so far as constitutional antidiscrimination rules are concerned. Each distinct institutional actor has its own processes for deliberating
on facts and law. Each has its own devices for intervening in
the world. It is not plausible to think that the same version of
discriminatory intent, and the same instruments for isolating
such intent, will be relevant in the thick of street policing, the
struggle of legislators to carve up new districts, and the efforts
of administrators and teachers to allocate educational resources fairly and efficiently. Given this variety, it is not sensible to constrain artificially the choice of evidentiary
instruments. Rather, the full toolkit for discovering discriminatory intent recognized in Arlington Heights should avail with
no categorical exclusions or presumptions of disfavor.
There is, nevertheless, one arguable exception to this logic
in relation to the judicial review of legislative action. This concerns judicial reliance on voters’ preferences. It is extremely
hard in most instances to connect voters’ preferences on a
specific policy to their action in the voting booth, and then to
the behavior of elected actors. The analysis of polling data can
point toward a rough demographic profile of a majority coalition.315 But even sophisticated analysis will not, except in the
314
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
315
See Jonathan T. Rothwell & Pablo Diego-Rosell, Explaining Nationalist Political Views: The Case of Donald Trump 1 (November 2, 2016), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2822059 (finding that “living in racially isolated communities with worse
health outcomes, lower social mobility, less social capital, greater reliance on
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most unusual cases of single-issue campaigns, isolate public
sentiments on specific issues. Moreover, many people in practice rely on their religious convictions when voting.316 Accounting for these preferences in a constitutional calculus
might constrict legitimate public political deliberation in untenable ways.317 Accordingly, it will ordinarily be the case that
evidence of voters’ intentions will not be relevant to an understanding of the “intent” of a law in this context.318
But this exclusion may well not be problematic. In contrast to most administrative actions or exercises of executive
discretion, legislators’ actions tend to be relatively public and
high visibility. Well-developed arrangements for lobbying and
influencing legislators also already exist. It might hence be
thought that legislation (as opposed to executive actors, especially when dispersed and relatively unsupervised) requires the
least constitutional supervision. As a result, exclusion of one
source from which to infer the motive behind legislation is not
problematic.
Otherwise, however, the time is ripe to return to a more
evenhanded and catholic evidentiary apparatus in grappling
with the many varieties of discriminatory intent barred under
the Equal Protection and Religion Clauses.
CONCLUSION
The granular ways of implementing grand, abstract ideas
such as ‘discriminatory intent’ turn out to be highly consequential on the ground. They shape the practical sense of constitutional guarantees. My aim here has been to tease out an
array of clashing and contesting ideas that lie behind that
seemingly unitary concept of discriminatory intent. Such conceptual diversity might well be beneficial, if it works to capture
the various ways in which impermissible classifications find
their way into government decision-making. Yet we must take
care to avoid an evidentiary apparatus that skews the allocasocial security income and less reliance on capital income, predicts higher levels
of Trump support”).
316
See Brad Lockerbie, Race and Religion: Voting Behavior and Political Attitudes, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 1145, 1155 (2013) (finding that “there are meaningful
differences [in voting] across religious groups in the United States”).
317
For an illuminating treatment, see Kent Greenawalt, Religion and Public
Reasons: Making Laws and Evaluating Candidates, 27 J.L. & POL. 387, 405
(2012), who writes that “[f]or many people, their religious convictions and affiliation are an important part of who they are.”
318
An exception to this resistance may be warranted when the public is motivated by animus. See supra text accompanying note 144.
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tion of judicial resources away from some deserving litigants
toward others. Achieving that level playing field requires no
dramatic doctrinal fix. What it entails is rather a return to the
appropriately capacious and flexible way in which the Court
initially proposed to discover unconstitutional discriminatory
intent when that notion first seized the Justices’ imagination.
It is, therefore, a rare instance that justifies a return to first
principles by appeal to forward-looking considerations.

